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Preface 
 
 
Prior to a monumental infrastructure project 150 years ago, the neighborhood where we compose this 
letter, Boston‘s Back Bay, was, in fact, a bay. Now it is one of Boston‘s most vibrant areas and 
considered to be one of the best-preserved examples of 19th-century urban design in the United States.  
It is filled with shops, hotels, cultural institutions and major office buildings—all of which generate 
considerable economic activity for the city, state and region. 
 
The Back Bay was a big idea and a massive investment.  But today, big ideas give us pause. Some of 
our skepticism comes from experience, as we look back at several of the disastrous projects that came 
about under the umbrella of ―urban renewal,‖ for example. There is no question that creating something 
like the Back Bay today would be difficult from a legal, financial and logistical standpoint.  But would 
we even have the foresight and courage to make such an investment? 
 
In past decades, future-focused investments were a significant portion of our nation‘s spending and 
responsible for innumerable accomplishments, including social innovations that broadened access to the 
middle class.  Where would the country be today without the New Deal, the GI Bill or the interstate 
highway system?  However, today‘s public sector is increasingly focused on entitlements and the 
―maintenance costs‖ of an aging population, with little left over for forward-looking investments.  In the 
1960s, approximately 14 cents of every federal dollar not going to interest payments was spent on 
entitlements; today it is 47 cents.  Nowhere is this change in spending priorities more apparent than in 
the Commonwealth‘s transportation infrastructure. 
 
Competing funding priorities and strained government coffers have limited the resources we have to 
invest in maintaining and expanding upon the transportation assets already in place—and in enhancing 
or upgrading the system to keep pace with our growing and evolving economy, which is constantly 
placing new demands on it.  Although Massachusetts currently has a robust, multimodal transportation 
network, its infrastructure is one of the oldest in the United States. The age and condition of this 
infrastructure represents a challenge to our transportation system‘s effectiveness, which in turn could 
seriously restrict the Commonwealth‘s economic potential. 
 
This report illuminates the consequences of failing to invest in our transportation infrastructure, which, 
without new resources, will continue a downward spiral. We expect this will be of interest to a wide 
range of business, civic and other stakeholders, since our transportation system—and its effect on the 
fiscal health of the Commonwealth—has a direct impact on all of us. We invite you to read this report 
and to work with us and other stakeholders to develop a response to the tremendous challenges it 
presents. 
 
 
 
        
 
Paul S. Grogan       Daniel O‘Connell 
President and CEO      President and CEO  
The Boston Foundation      Massachusetts Competitive Partnership 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Massachusetts is at a crossroads.  There is no doubt that the Commonwealth is recovering from the 
recession at a pace that is among the fastest in the nation.  Job growth is improving, the economy 
is back on track and the future looks bright, but there is a serious problem that could stop this 
growth in its tracks.  If Massachusetts does nothing to repair and improve its transportation 
infrastructure, the current recovery could easily stall.  This is not just a problem for Greater 
Boston.  Rather, it imperils jobs and economic growth throughout the entire state. Simply put, the 
Commonwealth‘s transportation network is essential to its vitality, competitiveness and quality of 
life. 
Today‘s transportation network is the cumulative result of a long history of past investments, but 
the continued quality of the system is in jeopardy. Competing funding priorities and strained 
government coffers are limiting the resources available to maintain the existing assets in a state of 
good repair and to expand and upgrade the system to keep pace with the Commonwealth‘s 
economy as it grows and evolves.  Failure to maintain the system and accommodate growth yields 
a strained transportation network with rising levels of road and transit congestion, potholes that are 
patched but not rebuilt, disabled transit vehicles that strand travelers and declining system 
reliability. 
There is a cost to doing nothing to address this challenge that goes beyond the day-to-day 
aggravation of an overburdened transportation system. As the Commonwealth system‘s state of 
good repair deteriorates through underinvestment, it imposes a cost on the economy in terms of 
rising congestion, reduced reliability and higher operating costs.  Like a private firm, the 
productivity of an economy is influenced by its level of investment.  
This report details transportation‘s critical role in Massachusetts: the benefits that highways, 
bridges, railroads and transit bring to the Commonwealth‘s economy, its residents and businesses. 
This Executive Summary summarizes the findings. The body of the report will detail the 
methodologies used and will discuss the results in more detail. 
 
Massachusetts has a history of investment in its transportation infrastructure. 
Past transportation investment has yielded the diverse network in use today. Massachusetts‘ 
transportation infrastructure is an effective network of critical highways, bridges, railroads and 
transit systems that connect the state‘s economy to the global economy through its air and seaport 
gateways. The value of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation‘s capital assets, defined 
as roads, bridges, ramps, tunnels and similar items, is more than $18 billion net of accumulated 
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depreciation.
1
 Built over many decades when costs were lower, the replacement cost for the system 
is much greater than its depreciated value suggests. The following highlights some of the more 
important and unique facets of the Commonwealth‘s multimodal system available today because 
of this pattern of past investment. 
 The Massachusetts Turnpike, now part of the MassDOT Highway Division, is 
Massachusetts‘ segment of Interstate 90, the transcontinental highway ending in 
Seattle. Revenue from tolls, rather than state or Federal tax revenue, paid for the 
bonds sold to finance the Massachusetts Turnpike‘s construction. Built 
incrementally over the past 55 years, the Turnpike is a critical artery that spans the 
Commonwealth. Construction of the original 123-mile segment ran from 1955 to 
1957. The Turnpike expanded in the early 1960s with the 12-mile Boston extension. 
In 1968, the Turnpike expanded further as the segment between Interchange 9 in 
Sturbridge and Interchange 12 in Framingham was widened from four to six lanes 
(three in each direction). Exit 11a that connects to Interstate 495 opened in 1969, 
allowing millions of vacationers destined for Cape Cod, New Hampshire and Maine 
the ability to use the facility, save time and help to maintain a thriving tourist 
economy in coastal Massachusetts.  
Investment and expansion continued through the 1990s; the Turnpike opened the 
Ted Williams Tunnel, a harbor tunnel crossing from South Boston to East Boston 
constructed as part of the Central Artery/Tunnel Project in 1995. This third harbor 
tunnel doubled traffic capacity between downtown Boston and Logan International 
Airport in East Boston and cut in half the average travel time between the I-90 – I-
93 junction and Logan Airport for most of the day.
2
 
 Massachusetts‘ legacy of public investment has yielded more than capital assets—it 
has developed innovative ways of delivering projects as well. The historic $3 
billion Patrick-Murray Accelerated Bridge Program represents a monumental 
investment in Massachusetts bridges. The eight-year program will replace or repair 
more than 200 structurally deficient bridges. MassDOT and its partner, the 
Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), will rely on the use of 
innovative and accelerated project development and construction techniques. Since 
2008, the number of former MassHighway and DCR structurally deficient bridges 
has dropped from 543 to 437, nearly a 20% decline. Even with this creative 
program, the Commonwealth will still have a significant backlog of deficient 
bridges after the program is complete. 
 
 The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) was one of the first 
combined regional transportation planning and operating agencies to be established 
in the United States. Founded in 1964, the ―T‖ builds on several centuries of mass 
transit operations in Boston, making it one of the oldest, if not the oldest, 
                                                 
1 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Financial Statements and Supplementary Schedules, June 2011, 
Section 3 Capital Assets, page 27. 
2 Economic Development Research Group, Inc., Transportation Impacts of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority 
and the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project, February 2006.  
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continuously operating mass transit system in the U.S., when its legacy 
organizations are considered. Originally serving 14 cities and towns, the network 
has grown to become the nation's fifth largest mass transit system, serving 176 
cities and towns with an area of 3,249 square miles. The average weekday ridership 
for the entire system is approximately 1.3 million passenger trips, one of only six 
agencies carrying more than a million passengers per day.
3
  In November 2012, 
ridership was up for the 20
th
 time in the last 22 months,
4
 despite a fare increase 
introduced in July 2012 that raised fares on average by 23%
5
 – a strong indication 
of the importance of transit as a primary mode of travel for many residents. 
 
 Fifteen Regional Transit Authorities (RTAs) are responsible for administering 
public transportation services in Massachusetts outside of the Boston metropolitan 
area. This represents a significant expansion since the state statute created the eight 
original RTAs in 1974. The RTAs serve 256 of the Commonwealth‘s 351 
communities
6
 with a fixed route ridership of more than 27 million and a demand 
response ridership of more than 2 million. The Commonwealth‘s RTAs carry more 
passengers than the transit systems of Orlando, Buffalo, Riverside and Tucson.
7
 
 
 With a strong maritime legacy, water transportation continues to be a component of 
the mobility network of Massachusetts, even as the focus has transitioned from a 
working waterfront in many cases to recreational and scenic uses.  The 
Commonwealth’s ferry system provides a means for visitors and commuters to 
bypass congested roadways to access downtown Boston. Ferry services are the 
lifeline to the islands of Nantucket, Martha‘s Vineyard and Cuttyhunk and allow the 
tourist industry to flourish during the summers—sustaining these economies. 
But the flip side of being an innovator and first among states is that the Commonwealth‘s public 
stock of infrastructure is older than average with rising needs for recapitalization to replace and 
modernize facilities and bring them up to modern design standards.  Both the MBTA and major 
sections of the Commonwealth’s interstate system are more than 50 years old.  The 2007 
Transportation Finance Commission, an independent body of transportation experts and business 
and civic leaders created by statute to examine and evaluate the financial health of Massachusetts 
transportation agencies and authorities, concluded that the Commonwealth‘s transportation system 
had been inadequately maintained for decades. This view is underscored by the recent reports of 
loose wall panels in the Callahan and Sumner Tunnels and increasing numbers of disabled trains in 
severe winter conditions. The 2007 Commission estimated that it would require at least an 
                                                 
3 APTA, Ridership Report, 3rd Quarter of 2012.   
4 http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2012/12/26/mbta-ridership-increases-again-
november/L1Ie483X4J1eW8xgCMnbUL/story.html  
5http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2012/06/30/mass_commuters_brace_for_steep_
mbta_fare_hike/  
6 Astrid Glynn, “Fixing Transit Finance: A Framework for Discussion,” A Better City Research Paper, April 
2011. 
7 MassDOT RTA ScoreCard, December 2009. Demand response service includes paratransit. 
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additional $15 to $19 billion in funding, above projected revenues, to bring its existing surface 
transportation system to a state of good repair and maintain it at that level. This estimate 
excluded expansion in capacity and/or service levels to accommodate population and workforce 
growth.  
Massachusetts is at a crossroads.   
Competing funding priorities, strained government coffers and the transportation system’s 
substantial debt burden have limited the resources invested in maintaining the transportation 
assets in place and in expanding / upgrading the system to keep pace with the Commonwealth’s 
economy as it grows and evolves—placing new demands on the system.  
Although Massachusetts currently has a robust, multimodal transportation network, the 
infrastructure is, as mentioned, among the oldest in the U.S. The age and condition of much of this 
infrastructure represents a challenge to maximizing the effectiveness of the transportation system, 
which in turn could restrict the economic potential of the Commonwealth if not addressed. This is 
particularly critical in 2013, as both the local and national economies are facing an uncertain 
recovery. Massachusetts has proven to be resilient during the recession, and while FY 2014 shows 
an improving revenue picture, the state is still a long way from experiencing the same level of revenue 
growth as it did prior to the recession. Continued recovery and strong economic performance may 
be compromised by an under-maintained transportation system and the inability to expand and 
accommodate future economic growth. 
The Commonwealth‘s high level of transportation debt as compared to other states, the inability of 
MassDOT and the MBTA to fund their full state of good repair needs and the growing operating 
deficits of the MBTA and Regional Transit Authorities are placing an ever-increasing pressure on 
the transportation system.   
 State of good repair needs are growing; Massachusetts is unable to keep up with 
funding its current infrastructure maintenance needs. 
o MassDOT has shown that $1 billion per year is needed for the Metropolitan 
Highway System Capital Maintenance Program, however, only $400 million 
is currently programmed annually.
8
   
o Massachusetts cities and towns also face a shortfall in the ability to maintain 
their streets and bridges in a state of good repair.  The Massachusetts 
Municipal Association puts the total need at $562 million/year, while 
Chapter 90 only provides $200 million per year – resulting in an annual 
shortfall of $362 million.
9
 
                                                 
8 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Capital Investment Plan FY 2011-2015, 2010.  
9 Massachusetts Municipal Association, MMA Study: Cities and Towns Need a Dramatic 
Increase in Chapter 90 Funding to Repair Local Roads, MMA Special Report, December 18, 2012.   
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o MassDOT has approximately $240 million in operating expenses being 
capitalized.  
o The MBTA backlog of good repair projects is at least $3 billion.   
o The 15 state RTAs are also facing a state of good repair backlog of $150 
million, largely due to an aging fleet.
10
 
 
 Debt service payments represent a large portion of Massachusetts’ annual 
transportation spending. 
o In FY 2012, 45% of the MassDOT and MBTA operating budgets went to 
pay off debt.
11
 
o MassDOT receives $648 million in federal funding. Of that, $159 million 
(nearly 25%) immediately goes back to the federal government to pay off 
the ―Grant Anticipation Notes‖ used to finance the Big Dig and the 
Accelerated Bridge Program.
12
   
o The MBTA is borrowing $470 million per year to cope with a state of good 
repair backlog that exceeds $3 billion.
13
 
o The MBTA has $8.6 billion with interest in outstanding debt. Of this debt, 
$3.6 billion was inherited from the Commonwealth in Forward Funding, 
including the so-called ―Big Dig debt‖ for transit commitments related to 
the Central Artery project.
14
 
o MBTA debt service payments were $448.2 million in FY 2012 and 30 cents 
of every dollar in revenue goes to pay debt. Debt service is roughly equal to 
fare box revenues and to the T‘s entire payroll.15 
Failure to maintain the transportation network creates uncertainty about future conditions and 
costs. This leads to a loss of business confidence and a reluctance to invest and expand, limiting 
economic development. When firms consider building new offices and factories, they take into 
account the long-term commitments to operate in that location. Rising congestion and 
deteriorating network reliability are signals that future business conditions may be more 
challenging, leading potential investors to consider other locations.  
Where we stand now.  
Setting aside the deteriorating age and condition of the system, projected growth highlights the 
need for operational improvements and capacity expansion. Congestion is not limited to the road 
system. 
                                                 
10 A Better City, Policy Position Paper on MBTA Fare Increase, March 2012.   
11 Transportation for Massachusetts, Maxed Out: Massachusetts Transportation at a Financing Crossroad, 
October 2011.   
12 Ibid. 
13 MBTA, MBTA Fare and Service Changes: Join the Discussion, January 2012. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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 Highway and roads 
o Highways and roads in Massachusetts supported  more than 54.5 million 
vehicle miles traveled in 2010, which included 37.9 billion ton-miles of 
shipping by truck with a value of $297.9 billion (in 2007 dollars).   
o The volume of traffic is projected to rise by 37% over the next 40 years for a 
total of 86.5 billion vehicle miles traveled in 2050.   
o Goods moved by truck account for 239 million tons, or 87%, of all freight 
movements in Massachusetts.  In line with those same trends, ton-miles of 
shipping by truck are expected to increase to 82.6 billion by 2040, a 128% 
increase.  The value of truck shipping is expected to increase by 123% to 
$663.8 billion (in 2007 dollars).  
 Freight 
o Freight volumes are projected to increase by 70% by 2030, with freight 
loads and facilities getting larger and most freight still moving by truck.
16
  
o At the same time, Massachusetts‘ multimodal freight transportation 
infrastructure is aging and struggling to compete due to congestion, 
clearances (from older bridges, overpasses and tunnels that were not 
designed for today‘s freight movements) and weight restrictions 
(particularly on older infrastructure rail).   
o Since freight transportation activity often conflicts with other land uses, 
many of these issues and potential solutions are inherently linked to 
passenger transportation.   
 MBTA  
o The MBTA has a limited ability to add capacity to meet projected ridership 
growth over the next two decades.  
o The MBTA‘s congestion problems raise concerns that potential MBTA 
riders will be forced to take autos for their travel, adding to road congestion.  
o It also means that future transit-oriented development could be impeded by 
lack of capacity—pushing economic development out to the periphery of the 
Boston region or to other communities. Key areas of concern include:  
Downtown Boston, Back Bay, the Longwood Medical Area, the Seaport and 
Kendall Square. Because of the ―hub and spoke‖ nature of the MBTA transit 
system, transit congestion in these core locations can affect future transit-
oriented development along the outer ―spokes‖ of the system as well.17 
o The Authority‘s fleet consists of some older locomotives, nearing the end of 
their useful lives, and others that are in great need of overdue top-deck 
overhauls. Between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2025, the MBTA projects that all 
80 of the current locomotive revenue fleet will be due for retirement based 
on a 25-year service life and will need to be replaced.
18
 This has had a 
noticeable effect on the reliability of the commuter rail system fleet. The 
mean number of miles between failures, a barometer of reliability, has been 
gradually dropping and now stands at about half the system goal of 10,000 
                                                 
16 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, State Freight Plan, September 2010. 
17 Stephanie Pollack, “Hub and Spoke Core Transit Congestion and The Future of Transit and Development 
in Greater Boston,” Urban Land Institute, 2012. 
18 2011 – 2025 MBTA Commuter Rail Fleet Management Plan, p. 9-1. 
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miles between failures.
19
 Obtaining funding for and carrying out scheduled 
overhauls and vehicle replacements are critical to ensuring reliable, on-time 
passenger service and maintaining the market.
20
  
 
 RTAs 
o While Massachusetts RTAs are not as capacity-constrained as the MBTA 
system, they struggle to provide non-peak service with regular headways.  
o Such services are essential for workers to be able to use the service as a 
regular means of commuting in an increasingly 24/7 economy, limiting the 
potential of transit to be a reliable alternative mode to the auto in these 
communities. 
There is a cost to doing nothing.  
When the system‘s physical qualities do not efficiently accommodate the movement of goods and 
people, performance deteriorates and imposes a cost—a severe penalty—on the Commonwealth‘s 
economy. This cost can occur through a variety of means as described below.  
 Facilities that are not in a state of good repair lead to increases in operating costs for 
cars, trucks and railroads and heighten the likelihood of crashes—translating into 
costs associated with property damage, injury and loss of life. By 2030, these 
operating and safety costs are expected to total $6.6 to $11.1 billion (in discounted 
2008 dollars).
21
 
 Increased congestion translates into greater travel times, diverting valuable time 
from productive work or the non-work activities that support a high quality of life. 
By 2030, these losses in travel time are expected to cost the Massachusetts‘ 
economy between $11.1 and $14.9 billion (in discounted 2008 dollars). 
 The diversion of additional resources to mitigate rising congestion and operating 
costs shifts resources to dealing with these problems, reducing the productivity of 
business in the Commonwealth. This translates into losses in income and jobs. It is 
estimated that between 12,300 and 15,600 jobs will be lost in Massachusetts due to 
its deficient highway transportation network by 2030.  
 Travelers‘ efforts to avoid highly congested points of the network—bottlenecks for 
example—can lead them to travel longer distances. 
 Rising congestion and bottlenecks erode travel reliability, increasing the amount of 
time commuters and shippers must allow to achieve on-time delivery. To 
                                                 
19 MassDOT. MBTA ScoreCard. September 2012. 
20 2011 – 2025 MBTA Commuter Rail Fleet Management Plan 
21 Values are discounted in order to report current and future benefits in a common metric, a net present 
value. Benefits received in the future are worth less than benefits received now because of the opportunity 
cost associated with having to wait for the benefit. 
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compensate, some shippers will hold higher inventories, raising their overall 
business costs as a result of the transportation system‘s performance. 
 
 Deteriorating system performance translates into vehicles that are not operating at 
their most efficient levels—yielding environmental costs.  The environmental 
consequences of traveling longer distances include impacts on air quality, increases 
in greenhouse gas emissions and rising water pollution from roadway runoff. 
 
 There is the real concern about deferred maintenance on the system and safety, but 
there is also an impact on the cost.  Fixing the system in the near term can help 
Massachusetts avoid cost growth in the future.  Based on historic trends, it is 
expected that the cost of construction will grow by 3.2% per year,
22
 with 10 years 
from now producing a compounded cost that is 37% higher than today. There is an 
additional concern that constrained state and federal revenue growth may lag cost 
growth, aggravating the problem. 
 
This report describes and focuses on how losses of transportation system performance affect the 
performance the Massachusetts economy. Because transportation infrastructure is ever-present in 
our daily lives and because the erosion of system performance generally happens incrementally 
over time, its true cost to the economy is not seen on a day-to-day basis. 
This is a statewide problem.  
All Massachusetts regions will feel the effects of the state‘s eroding transportation infrastructure. 
That said, there are important differences in the economic composition of each sub-state region 
that in turn defines the types of transportation investments needed to sustain and foster business 
activity in each region. For example, the eastern regions of the Commonwealth rely more on just-
in-time delivery for service industries and time-sensitive manufactured goods; the western regions 
host greater concentrations of traditional manufacturing and thus rely on moving bulk commodities 
that are less time-sensitive.
23
 The southeast region has the highest share of freight-dependent jobs 
of any region at 51 percent.
24
 This is due, in part, to the existence of ports in Fall River and New 
Bedford, and numerous inland distribution centers. 
                                                 
22 ENR, Construction Cost Index, Average Annual Growth, 1990-2011. 
23 MassDOT, Freight Plan, September 2010. 
24 Freight-dependent jobs include manufacturing, transportation and logistics employment. MassDOT 
Freight Plan, September 2010. 
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Figure ES-1: Massachusetts Freight-Dependent Employment by Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Department of Commerce from IMPLAN, Calculations by EDR Group.  Graphic from 
Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, September 2010. 
 
Eastern Massachusetts 
Large, complex urban areas, such as Boston and the associated Northeast Corridor megapolitan 
region that it helps to anchor, exist because they are focal points for commercial transactions. 
Urban areas provide access to large pools of labor, frequent and relatively inexpensive air 
transport, specialized technical and professional services and a large client base.  
These factors and others provide so-called “agglomeration economies” that diminish the cost of 
transactions and make the urban area’s firms more productive. Balanced against the advantages 
of urban size are the diseconomies of large urban areas; these negatives include higher living and 
business costs such as rents, crime and traffic congestion. As long as firms and households 
perceive that the advantages outweigh the negatives of a Boston location, firms and households 
will locate in the urban area, incur the costs and the metro economy will grow and thrive. When 
the negatives just equal the benefits, the urban area is at its optimal size and growth will languish. 
When the negatives outweigh the benefits, existing businesses choose to expand elsewhere and 
population growth slows. 
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Investments to expand travel capacity or improve the travel time of public transit service reduce 
the negatives associated with congestion, thus influencing the urban area‘s size and density of 
people and firms—it is a critical factor that influences sensitivity to land and labor costs. Absent 
the ability to reliably move large numbers of specialized skilled labor in, out and within the 
urban economy on a daily basis such as that provided by the MBTA system, Boston’s and the 
region’s economic potential is constrained. The same idea holds true for other types of 
infrastructure as well. Each infrastructure investment in the overall Boston regional travel 
network, expansions such as the South Coast Rail project, extensions to the existing system, or 
improvements to the existing system that relieve bottlenecks and add capacity at core areas expand 
the ability of the economy to manage density. These benefits are capitalized into the property 
values at the locations where the benefits are consumed, and improve access and mobility 
supporting the economic vitality of the region. The Boston metropolitan region‘s job shed extends 
throughout Massachusetts.  Access to urban core is directly related to job retention and growth.  In 
addition, the ability to offer a sustainable quality of life through improved transportation is thus 
central to Boston‘s and the region‘s ability to offset the costs of population and employment 
growth.  
 
Central Massachusetts 
Four industries account for 50 percent of the employment base in the Central Massachusetts 
region: Health Care, Education, Retail and Manufacturing.
25
 This mix reflects the region‘s 
economic transition from reliance on traditional industries, such as manufacturing and logistics, to 
developing its own mix of knowledge industries such as health care and education. Supporting the 
region through this transition means sustaining the remaining existing industry but also 
fostering connections between the health care and education cluster in Central Massachusetts 
and that of Eastern Massachusetts. This regional interaction has benefits for both Worcester and 
Boston because as they become more integrated economically, they can begin to compete as a 
larger economy. It is no longer Worcester competing in the global economy or Boston competing 
on its own, but rather the complementary resources of both competing together. Investments such 
as Worcester‘s $32 million dollar renovation of the intermodal Union Station building is a major 
initiative that anchors development but also fosters a connection with Boston. The MBTA 
currently operates 13 round-trip trains per day between Union Station and Boston, with more to be 
added in the future. This train service accommodates more than 1,000 daily passengers. The bus 
pavilion will have a transfer hub to service approximately 230 buses a day. The transfer station 
design has been incorporated as part of the surrounding Innovation District. Enhancing the 
Worcester commuter rail corridor will also help strengthen the Worcester region‘s economic 
growth. 
                                                 
25 Greater Worcester CEDS, 2012. 
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Western Massachusetts 
A striking result of the 2002-03 ―Knowledge Corridor‖ study was that 45% of graduating seniors 
planned to leave the region.
26
  Home to some of the nation‘s leading educational institutions and a 
region of high-quality amenities that draw significant tourist visitation each year, the region was 
losing its younger generation as they sought areas with greater economic opportunity. Set against 
this backdrop, the focus of transportation investment in the western region is more on fostering 
access rather than providing capacity as in the eastern portion of the state. By promoting north-
south access and ignoring state boundaries, the region is using its transportation investments to 
expand the diversity of economic opportunity within the functional region. For example, the 
Knowledge Corridor - Restore Vermonter Project will restore Amtrak's intercity passenger train 
service to its original route by relocating the Vermonter to its former route on the Pan Am 
Southern Railroad. This routing offers a shorter and more direct route for the Vermonter between 
Springfield and East Northfield and improves access to densely populated areas along the 
Connecticut River. The anticipated benefits, including a 25-minute reduction in travel time, an 
associated 24 percent gain in Vermonter ridership and greater reliability, collectively support 
economic revitalization and reduce traffic congestion by offering a reliable alternative.  In 
Springfield, I-91 is a major north-south highway and a main artery of the Knowledge Corridor.  
The viaduct that carries I-91 parallel to the Connecticut River is deteriorating and will require a 
major investment in order to maintain access across Massachusetts and into Vermont. 
Estimated Impacts. 
The diversion of additional resources to mitigate rising congestion and operating costs shifts 
resources to dealing with these problems, reducing the productivity of business in the 
Commonwealth. This translates into losses in income and jobs. As mentioned, it is estimated that 
between 12,300 and 15,600 jobs will be lost in Massachusetts as a result of its deficient highway 
transportation network by 2030. This is a small fraction when compared to the total size of the 
state‘s employment base, but it is equivalent to losing one of the state‘s largest employers nearly 
every year. 
To estimate the costs of not funding Massachusetts‘ highway state of good repair needs, the 
Federal Highway Administration‘s (FHWA) Highway Economic Requirements System – State 
Version (HERS-ST) model was used.  These costs are measured in the model as the benefits of 
funding the full highway maintenance state of good repair needs in Massachusetts‘ Capital 
Investment Plan FY 2011-2015 rather than maintaining the current levels of funding shown in the 
plan.  The HERS-ST results are summarized in the table below.  It is important to note that HERS-
ST does not identify improvements for bridge structure deficiencies and bike-pedestrian access; 
therefore, funding and needs associated with these programs are excluded from the analysis.   
                                                 
26 Hartford-Springfield State of the Region 2012 Conference. 
  12 
       
The  Cos t  o f  Do ing  No th ing  |  The  Ec onomic  Cas e  f o r  T rans po r ta t i on  I nv es tmen t  i n  Mass ac hus e t t s  
Table ES-1: Estimated Benefits of Funding Massachusetts’ Highway State of Good Repair 
Needs Summary (2010-2030) 
  
  
Range of Savings (in Billions of Discounted 2008 dollars)* 
Low High 
Travel Time Savings $ 11.1 $ 14.9 
Operating Cost & Safety Savings $ 6.6 $ 11.1 
Total Benefits $ 17.7 $ 26.0 
*Benefits shown are discounted using a 7% discount rate. 
 By 2030, losses in highway system performance are expected to cost 
Massachusetts‘ economy between $11.1 and $14.9 billion (in discounted 2008 
dollars) in lost travel time.
27
  
 An additional $6.6 to $11.1 billion (in discounted 2008 dollars) in vehicle operating 
costs avoided and safety benefits if the highway system were in a state of good 
repair, which would reduce household budgets for other types of spending, such as 
education and health-related purchases, and recreational spending. 
Productivity matters for Massachusetts—a high wage and high cost state relative to the nation—
because firms are willing to pay more productive workers higher wages. Massachusetts has the 
highest business costs in the nation. When the benefits of high productivity no longer outweigh 
operational costs, employers‘ earnings growth will slow and firms will seek locations outside of 
Massachusetts for expansion or relocation. In short, the private sector of an economy that 
underinvests in its transportation system becomes less competitive over time. 
Table ES-2: State Business Cost Comparison for Massachusetts and its Neighbors 
Massachusetts and 
Surrounding States 
Cost of Doing Business Unit Labor Cost Energy Cost 
State & Local Tax 
Burden 
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank 
Massachusetts 124 1 117 1 169 3 99 19 
Connecticut 113 4 99 24 183 2 111 8 
New Hampshire 111 7 104 7 162 4 80 45 
New York 110 9 97 29 146 8 142 1 
Vermont 110 10 104 5 130 11 111 7 
Rhode Island 102 14 92 39 150 6 109 9 
Source: Moody‘s Analytics 
Note: An index value of 100 means a state‘s costs are equal to the U.S. average. States are ranked out of 51 
(50 states plus the District of Columbia). A rank of 1 is the highest cost; a rank of 51 is the lowest. 
                                                 
27 Values are discounted in order to report current and future benefits in a common metric, a net present 
value. Benefits received in the future are worth less than benefits received now because of the opportunity 
cost associated with having to wait for the benefit. 
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Not only do transportation investments help us get around safely and reliably, move needed goods 
and help grow businesses and jobs, they also have their own direct economic benefits and 
influences. For every dollar in transportation capital investments spending, Massachusetts delivers 
$2.04 dollars in output, due to the multiplier effects.
28
 This spending supports additional jobs and 
earnings in the Commonwealth.   
 Between 2007 and 2012, annual capital transportation expenditures by MassDOT 
and the MBTA have created or supported 24,847 average annual person-jobs and 
$1.23 billion (in 2012 dollars) in earnings in Massachusetts.  
 Construction, administration and project management throughout the 
Commonwealth have contributed to these gains. 
There are interactions among modal performance.  
 Performance losses in transit can impose costs on highway travelers.  As transit 
capacity is reached, more travelers will be forced onto the roads. Growing capacity 
constraints for the MBTA and the RTAs‘ inability to expand service limit their 
ability to offset or serve as a relief valve for highway congestion. 
 Airports and seaports in Massachusetts are gateways to the global economy.  If 
people and goods cannot efficiently reach these gateways, the Massachusetts 
economy cannot grow or sell its products to a global market. 
 Given that the knowledge economy is an anchor of Massachusetts economy, the 
efficient movement of people is essential for it to work and compete. 
Collectively, this loss of transportation performance threatens Massachusetts’ ability to be a 
global competitor in coming decades. 
 The health of the state‘s economic anchor relies on daily efficient movement of 
people in and out of Boston, the urban core, and economic centers throughout the 
state. Without an efficient transportation system, the daily flow of workers and 
goods to the dense urban market could not be achieved. 
 Landside access to the state‘s marine ports and airports is critical to utilizing these 
gateways to the global economy. Air and marine carriers select ports (air or marine) 
with efficient inland distribution networks for imports.  
 The efficient operation of the state‘s road, bridge and transit network is necessary 
for the Commonwealth to remain a dominant economy within the U.S. Northeast 
region. 
                                                 
28 BEA, RIMS II Regional Multipliers for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Type II, 2010 
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Conclusion 
This report details some of the very serious consequences of ―doing nothing‖ about 
Massachusetts‘ transportation needs.  While it focuses on the direct economic impact of a failure to 
act, it only alludes to the broader consequences of inaction. 
 
While Massachusetts is outperforming our peer states in recovering from the recession, it is also 
operating within a global economy that is increasingly highly competitive.  In order to compete 
effectively in this swiftly changing economic atmosphere—and continue to be a place that is 
attractive to businesses and residents—the Commonwealth must not only address the looming 
problems described in this report, but anticipate the tremendous infrastructure needs of the near 
and distant future. 
 
The Boston Foundation, the Massachusetts Competitive Partnership and numerous other nonprofit, 
civic and business institutions must work together to address our immediate transportation needs to 
ensure Massachusetts‘ future economic growth and vitality.
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE MASSACHUSETTS TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM AT A GLANCE 
Transportation System Overview 
The Massachusetts transportation system is crucial to the Commonwealth‘s future economic 
success and a key component of the state‘s ability to remain economically competitive in a fast-
changing global context.  It provides essential access for residents, workers, visitors and businesses 
to markets, jobs, goods and services.   
The Commonwealth has an extensive commuter and multimodal transportation system with roads 
and bridges, commuter and freight rail, marine transportation and more. The value of the 
Massachusetts Department of Transportation‘s capital assets, defined as roads, bridges, ramps, 
tunnels and similar items, is more than $18 billion net of accumulated depreciation
29
. Built over 
many decades when costs were lower, the replacement costs for the system are much greater than 
its depreciated value suggests. Its major features include:  
 More than 36,000 miles of public roads30  
 138 miles of toll roads on the Massachusetts Turnpike owned and operated by 
MassDOT31  
 5,099 bridges32  
 11,972 buses operated by 16 public transportation authorities and a network of 
other private and public transit operators
[33] [34]  
 39 commercial or general aviation airports35  
 896 miles of freight railroad tracks operated by 11 different railroad companies[36] 
[37]  
 An extensive commuter rail line serving the Greater Boston area  
                                                 
29 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Financial Statements and Supplementary Schedules, June 2011, 
Section 3 Capital Assets, p.27. 
30
  Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2010, HM-20.  
31  Ibid, HM-25. 
32  Ibid, BR-7. 
33  Ibid, MV-10. 
34 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Regional Transit Authorities - Transit 
Division,  http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/transit/RegionalTransitAuthorities.aspx 
35 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Statewide Airport Economic Impact Study, 
Executive Summary, 2010, p. 1.   
36 Association of American Railroads, Freight Railroads in Massachusetts, 2010.  
37 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Regional Freight Rail Operators - Transit 
Division, http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/transit/RegionalFreightRailOperators.aspx 
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 Several commuter ferry lines and five major seaports and several harbors of varying 
sizes38 
 152 miles of shared-use paths39  
The transportation system in the Commonwealth is aging rapidly and becoming constrained. Both 
major sections of Massachusetts‘ interstate system and the MBTA are more than 50 years old. The 
2007 Transportation Finance Commission, an independent body of transportation experts and 
business and civic leaders created by statute to examine and evaluate the financial health of 
Massachusetts transportation agencies and authorities, concluded that the Commonwealth‘s 
transportation system had been inadequately maintained for decades. This view is underscored by 
the recent experience with loose wall panels in the Callahan and Sumner Tunnels and increasing 
numbers of disabled trains in severe winter conditions. The 2007 Commission estimated that it 
would require at least an additional $15 to $19 billion in funding above projected revenues to bring 
its existing surface transportation system to a state of good repair and maintain it at that level
40
. 
This estimate excluded expansion in capacity and/or service levels to accommodate population and 
workforce growth. Annually, it is estimated that traffic congestion on the Commonwealth‘s 
highways accounts for 93 million person hours and more than half of Massachusetts bridges are 
either structurally deficient or functionally obsolete
41
.  
In the near future, the Commonwealth‘s transportation system will need funding for further 
expansions and repairs. A few examples include the following: 
 $1 billion per year is needed for the Metropolitan Highway System Capital 
Maintenance Program. Only $400 million is currently programmed annually for the 
Program
42
.  
 MassDOT has $200 million in operating expenses being capitalized. 
 The MBTA backlog of state of good repair projects is at least $3 billion43. 
 The Port of Boston alone serves 30% of New England‘s waterborne cargo and is the 
largest container port in the region. At Massport, 63% of the revenue generated 
comes from container handling. One long-term strategic opportunity is an 
improvement that would dredge to a 48-foot depth navigation access channel and a 
50-foot depth entrance channel to Conley Terminal
44
. As the needs develop, a 
financial commitment to Massachusetts ports will become essential. 
 To ensure a safe and efficient airport system in Massachusetts, an estimated $1.07 
billion will be needed through 2030
45
. 
                                                 
38 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, p. 2-82.   
39 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Bicycling in Massachusetts, 2012.  
40 Massachusetts Transportation Finance Commission, Transportation Finance in Massachusetts: An 
Unsustainable System, March 2007. 
41 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, p. ES-31.  
42 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Capital Investment Plan FY 2011-2015, 2010.  
43 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Capital Investment Program, FY2012-FY2016, 2011, p. 5.  
44 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, pp. 2-96 and 2-109.    
45 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Statewide Airport System Plan, Executive 
Summary, 2010, p. 22.  
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 Between 2007 and 2011, more than $39 million was invested in the construction of 
23 shared-used paths covering 45 miles of new facilities. The Bay State Greenway 
100 prioritizes the next 100 miles of shared-use paths and will require additional 
funding to support the Bay State Greenway initiative
46
. 
The sections below highlight the importance of each mode to the Commonwealth. 
Highways, Roads and Bridges 
The road network is the largest component of the Massachusetts transportation system, containing 
72,000 lane miles and 5,000 bridges
47
. Of this, more than 9,500 lane miles and 3,500 bridges are 
owned and maintained by MassDOT and are predominantly composed of higher function classes, 
such as Interstates and principal arterials
48
. While MassDOT accounts for only 13% of the lane 
miles in the Commonwealth, its roadways carry 58% of the annual VMT49.  
The current pavement condition of MassDOT‘s road system is below the agency‘s target rating.  
The average current pavement rating for MassDOT interstates is 3.5, or excellent, while the target 
rating is 4.0.  Similarly, the average current pavement condition for MassDOT non-interstates is 
3.0, or good, while the target rating is 3.5.  To reach these target pavement conditions, MassDOT 
estimates that an additional investment of $313 million per year for the next five years would be 
required50.   
The historic $3 billion Patrick-Murray Accelerated Bridge Program represents a monumental 
investment in Massachusetts bridges. The eight year program will replace or repair more than 200 
structurally deficient bridges. Since 2008, the number of former MassHighway and Department of 
Conservation and Recreation structurally deficient bridges has dropped from 543 to 437, a decline 
of nearly 20%. Even with this creative program, the Commonwealth will still have a significant 
backlog of deficient bridges after the program is complete. 
                                                 
46 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Bay State Greenway Implementation, 2011.  
47 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Capital Investment Plan FY 2011-2015, September 2010, 
Chapter 3, p. 3.  
48 Ibid, Chapter 3, p. 8. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, Chapter 3, pp.6-7. 
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MassDOT also owns and maintains the assets that were once part of the Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority, including the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-90 extending 138 miles from Logan 
International Airport to the New York border), Central Artery (depressed section of I-93 through 
Boston, and three Harbor Tunnels (the Sumner, Callahan and Ted Williams)
51
. Additionally, 
MassDOT operates the Tobin Memorial Bridge connecting the Charlestown section of Boston with 
Chelsea
52
.  The toll facilities are highlighted in Figure 1-1. 
Figure 1-1: Massachusetts Toll Facilities 
Source: MassDOT Capital Investment Plan
53
 
The highways and roads in Massachusetts supported more than 54.5 million vehicle miles traveled 
in 2010
54
, which included 37.9 billion ton-miles of shipping by truck with a value of $297.9 billion 
                                                 
51 Ibid, Chapter 2, p. 10. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Capital Investment Plan FY2011-2015, September 2010, 
Chapter 2, p.11. 
54 Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2010, VM-2.  
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(in 2007 dollars)
55
. The volume of traffic is projected to rise by 37% over the next 40 years for a 
total of 86.5 billion vehicle miles traveled in 2050
56
. In line with those same trends, ton-miles of 
shipping by truck are expected to increase to 82.6 billion by 2040, a 128% increase
57
. The value of 
truck shipping is expected to increase by 123% to $663.8 billion (in 2007 dollars)
58
. 
Transit 
Massachusetts‘ largest transportation hub is in the city of Boston, which is served by the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). Originally serving 14 cities and towns, the 
network has grown to become the nation's 5th largest mass transit system, serving 176 cities and 
towns with an area of 3,249 square miles. The MBTA offers approximately 200 bus routes, 
subway, commuter rail and ferry boats throughout the region, serving approximately 1.3 million 
riders on a typical weekday
59
. The MBTA is one of only six agencies carrying more than a million 
passengers per day. The breakdown of ridership by mode is shown in the chart below. The 
dominant share of ridership uses heavy rail (subway) followed by bus and light rail. 
Figure 1-2: MBTA Ridership Breakdown by Service Type  
Source: MBTA ScoreCard
60
  
                                                 
55 Federal Highway Administration, Freight Analysis Frame Work, FAF3.4 State summary by Dmsmode and 
Trade, 2007 and 2011.xlsx.  
56 Ruder, Adam, "Smart Growth Opportunities for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Massachusetts." 
Diss. Harvard University, 2008.  
57 Federal Highway Administration, Freight Analysis Frame Work, FAF3.4 State summary by Dmsmode and 
Trade, 2040.xlsx.   
58 Ibid. 
59 APTA, Ridership Report, 3rd Quarter of 2012.   
60 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, MBTA ScoreCard, 2012. 
http://www.mbta.com/about_the_mbta/scorecard/ 
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The map below shows both the subway system (Rapid Transit Line) and Commuter Rail lines and 
the extensions into neighboring communities.  
Figure 1-3: MBTA Commuter Rail and Rapid Transit Lines 
Source: MBTA 
Fifteen Regional Transit Authorities (RTAs) are responsible for administering public 
transportation services in Massachusetts outside of the Boston metropolitan area today. The 
additional public transportation authorities in the Commonwealth offer buses and paratransit 
services for the community‘s needs, often linking to MBTA or Amtrak stations on the Northeast 
Corridor (NEC) and Knowledge Corridor.  This represents a significant expansion since the state 
statute created the eight original RTAs in 1974. The RTAs serve 256 of the Commonwealth‘s 351 
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communities
61
  with a fixed route ridership of more than 27 million and a demand response 
ridership of more than 2 million. The Commonwealth‘s RTAs carry more passengers than the 
transit systems of Orlando, Buffalo, Riverside and Tucson
62
. These Regional Transit Authorities 
(RTAs) are:  
 Berkshire Regional Transit Authority (BRTA)  
 Brockton Regional Transit Authority (BAT)  
 Cape Ann Transit Authority (CATA)  
 Cape Cod Regional Transit Authority (CCRTA)  
 Franklin Regional Transit Authority (FRTA)  
 Greater Attleboro Taunton Transit Authority (GATRA) 
 Lowell Regional Transit Authority (LRTA) 
 Martha‘s Vineyard Transit Authority (VTA) 
 Merrimack Valley Transit Authority (MVRTA) 
 MetroWest Regional Transit Authority (MWRTA) 
 Montachusett Regional Transit Authority (MART) 
 Nantucket Regional Transit Authority (NRTA) 
 Pioneer Valley Regional Transit Authority (PVTA) 
 Southeastern Regional Transit Authority (SRTA) 
 Worcester Regional Transit Authority (WRTA) 
The areas they serve are shown on the map in Figure 1-4
63
. 
  
                                                 
61 Astrid Glynn, “Fixing Transit Finance: A Framework for Discussion,” A Better City Research Paper, April 
2011. 
62 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, RTA ScoreCard, December 2009. Demand response service 
includes paratransit. 
63 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Regional Transit Authorities - Transit 
Division, http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/transit/RegionalTransitAuthorities.aspx 
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Figure 1-4: Massachusetts Regional Transit Authorities  
Source: MassDOT, Office of Transportation Planning  
Perhaps one of the most unique types of transit in Massachusetts is ferryboats. Ferry ridership only 
accounts for a small fraction of MBTA‘s ridership; however, it is an important component to the 
tourism industry. Several other ferry operators offer services in Massachusetts in addition to 
MBTA. These operators include the Steamship Authority, six municipalities, as well as a handful 
of private companies that operate ferry services. Many of these services are seasonal, operating 
only in summer months64.  
Additionally, Massachusetts is located along Amtrak‘s Northeast Corridor (NEC), which provides 
intercity passenger rail in Massachusetts and throughout the Northeast. Within the 
Commonwealth, there are approximately 56 trains operating daily and serving 11 stations: 
Amherst, Boston-Back Bay, Boston-North Station, Boston-South Station, Framingham, Haverhill, 
Pittsfield, Route 128 (Boston), Springfield, Woburn and Worcester. In FY 2012, the total number 
of boardings and alightings in Massachusetts was 3.13 million, a 5.7% increase from the year 
                                                 
64 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Passenger Ferry Transportation in Massachusetts, 2012.  
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prior
65
. This rail network is also a part of the Knowledge Corridor which connects several rail lines 
in New England. MassDOT was awarded $70 million by the Federal Railroad Administration to 
rehabilitate 49 miles of track and construct two stations in Western Massachusetts. This project 
complements other projects in the region, improving service in the corridor
66
.  
Freight Rail 
The freight railroads in Massachusetts span the state, moving a variety of commodities, including 
paper/pulp, miscellaneous mixed shipments, chemicals, waste/scrap, and food/kindred products67. 
The network of companies includes thirteen freight rail operators: one class I operator, five 
regional railroads, four short line railroads, and two terminal line railroads.  
Class I (CSX Transportation) 
Regional operators (Pan Am Railways, Pan Am Southern, Providence and Worcester, New 
England Central Railroad and Connecticut Southern Railroad)  
Short line railroads (Grafton and Upton Railroad, Bay Colony Railroad, Housatonic Railroad, 
Pioneer Valley Railroad and Massachusetts Coastal Railroad)  
Terminal line railroads (East Brookfield & Spencer Railroad and Fore River Transportation 
Corporation)  
Like passenger rail, freight is also connected to the Northeast Corridor (NEC) 68. 
The freight shipped by rail in Massachusetts totaled 6.5 billion ton-miles in 2010 with a value of 
$4.8 billion (in 2007 dollars). By 2040, the volume is expected to grow by 65.1% to 10.8 billion 
ton-miles. The value is expected to grow by 87.3% to $8.96 billion (in 2007 dollars)69.
 
 
  
                                                 
65 Amtrak, “Amtrak Fact Sheet, Fiscal Year 2012 – State of Massachusetts,” November 2012. 
http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/factsheets/MASSACHUSETTS12.pdf 
66 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, p. ES-28.  
67 Ibid. p. 3-15. 
68 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Regional Freight Rail Operators - Transit 
Division, http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/transit/RegionalFreightRailOperators.aspx  
69 Federal Highway Administration, Freight Analysis Frame Work: FAF3.4 State summary by Dmsmode and 
Trade, 2040.xlsx.  
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Figure 1-5: Massachusetts Rail Network 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation Freight Plan, September 2010 
Ports 
The Port of Boston is the largest of Massachusetts‘ seaports, serving three major industries: 
containerized cargo, vacation cruises and Boston‘s commercial fishing fleet, as well as hosting 
privately-owned petroleum and liquefied natural gas terminals, among other operations. Conley 
Terminal serves several large container lines, handling nearly 1.5 million metric tons of 
containerized cargo each year and approximately 10 million metric tons of bulk cargo
70
.
 
 
Cruiseport Boston serves more than 300,000 passengers annually to a variety of destinations. The 
port is a major economic hub to the region, contributing more than $2 billion to the local, regional 
and national economies through direct, indirect, and induced impacts
71
. 
In addition to the Port of Boston, the other Massachusetts compact ports are Gloucester, which 
primarily handles fish and fish products; Salem, which primarily handles coal and oil; New 
Bedford, which primarily handles household goods and perishables including fish; and Fall River, 
which handles fish, vehicles, heavy equipment, chemicals, liquid latex, coal and petroleum 
products
72
. The 18 additional ports and harbors in Massachusetts primarily serve recreational 
                                                 
70 Massport, Port of Boston, http://www.massport.com/port-of-boston/ 
71 Ibid. 
72 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, p. 91.  
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boaters and the commercial fishing industry, as well as hosting several ferry boats and sightseeing 
tours
73
.  
Figure 1-6: Massachusetts Port and Maritime Network 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation Freight Plan, September 2010 
 
In addition, Massachusetts is in a position to participate in short-sea shipping opportunities, which  
typically can be cost-competitive with trucking only if the beginning and ending points are 400 
miles or more apart. For example, a route between Massachusetts and Maine is unlikely to prove to 
be cost-competitive. However, Massachusetts is located along one of the more promising routes 
proposed to date, including the M-95 Corridor between New Bedford, MA and Port Canaveral, FL, 
as shown on the map in Figure 1-7. Short-sea shipping remains significantly underused as a cost-
effective alternative for goods movement. 
 
                                                 
73 World Port Source - Massachusetts, United States, “WPS Map of Ports in Massachusetts," 
http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/USA_MA.php 
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Figure 1-7: U.S. Marine Highway Corridors 
 
Source: MARAD 
Aviation 
Massachusetts is home to 30 commercial and nine general aviation airports, as shown on the map 
in Figure 1-8
74
.
 
The largest airport in the New England region is Logan International Airport 
located in Boston, which served 28.9 million passengers in 2011
75
 and generates more than $7 
billion in economic activity each year
76
. In 2004, the FAA projected that Logan International 
Airport could see as much as 4.4% average annual growth in passenger traffic through 2020
77
.  
  
                                                 
74 Department of Transportation, Massachusetts Statewide Airport Economic Impact Study, Executive Summary, 
2010, p. 2. 
75
 Massport, Airport Statistics, Logan Statistics for 2011 (December), 2011.   
76 Massport, About Logan, 2013. http://www.massport.com/logan-airport/about-logan/Pages/Default.aspx  
77 Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region Airport System Plan, 2006.  
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In addition to passenger movement, Massachusetts airports also move freight.  Air freight in 
Massachusetts currently constitutes about 0.1% of all freight tonnage in the state, however it 
carries 5.5% of the value. It is projected to be the fastest-growing mode of freight transportation in 
Massachusetts over the next 25 years, increasing its volume by up to five times its current level
78
. 
The majority of air freight (in terms of value) travels to/from Logan International Airport, and 
totaled $8.8 billion in 2007
79
. 
Figure 1-8: Massachusetts Airport Network  
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation Freight Plan, September 2010 
  
                                                 
78 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Freight Plan, 2010, pp. 2-143.   
79 Ibid, p.2-146. 
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Bike and Pedestrian Facilities 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is currently developing the Bay State Greenway (BSG) 
network, with the goal of eventually designating 788 miles of shared-use paths for bicycles. The 
seven-corridor system includes both on-road and off-road shared-use paths and currently includes 
more than 30 different shared use paths totaling 152 miles. The map below shows the network‘s 
existing and proposed paths throughout the state80. 
Figure 1-9: Massachusetts Bay State Greenway Network 
Source: MassDOT 
                                                 
80 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Bicycling in Massachusetts, 2012.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MASSDOT  
AND MBTA ACTIVITIES 
This chapter discusses the direct economic impacts of transportation investments and expenditures 
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  It examines the historical trend in employment and 
earnings that has occurred to date, as a result of Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
(MassDOT) and Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) expenditures. The impacts 
highlighted in this chapter represent those jobs and earnings supported and created by previous 
MassDOT capital and operating expenditures, not future impacts.  However, the impacts shown in 
this chapter provide an indication of the potential job and earnings impacts of future MassDOT 
expenditures, if expenditure levels remain at historic levels.   
The employment and earnings impacts described in this chapter include those that result from: 
 Capital impacts. Construction expenditures incurred for transportation assets, 
including highways, transit, aeronautics and the Central Arterial Tunnel project 
between 2007 and 2012 that created new jobs and expanded payrolls for the 
duration of each project‘s construction cycle. The capital expenditures include 
construction and project/program management (soft costs such as engineering, 
planning, design, administration and management).  These impacts are temporary, 
and vary from year to year based on capital budget expenses.   
 Operations and maintenance impacts. Operations and maintenance expenses 
incurred by MassDOT and MBTA between 2007 and 2012 that created and 
sustained jobs and payrolls in Massachusetts. The operating and maintenance 
expenditures include the direct MassDOT and MBTA employment as well as the 
local purchases of goods and services necessary to operate and maintain each 
division. Unlike the one-time capital impacts, these operations and maintenance 
jobs and earnings impacts generally are considered to be recurring impacts that 
occur as long as the transportation system continues to operate at its current levels.  
Should maintenance expenditures decline, these impacts would diminish. 
The capital and operating impacts associated with the Commonwealth‘s transportation activities 
represent the direct effects of the MassDOT and MBTA transportation expenditures.  The 
purchases associated with MassDOT and MBTA capital projects and general operations stimulate 
demand for support industries.  As a result, a further increase of new employment across a variety 
of supporting industrial sectors and occupational categories occurs as employers hire to meet this 
increase in local demand.  Additionally, the earnings of these newly-hired construction and 
operations and maintenance workers translate into a proportional increase in consumer demand, as 
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these workers purchase goods and services throughout the region.  This latter hiring represents the 
indirect and induced impacts associated with MassDOT and MBTA expenditures.  
The direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts associated with MassDOT and MBTA capital 
projects and operations and maintenance are measured by using regional multipliers from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) within the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Derived from the 
Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II), the RIMS II multipliers measure the total 
change (direct + indirect + induced effects) in employment and earnings that result from an 
incremental change in final demand for a particular industry.  The multipliers are based on the 
2010 Annual Series accounts data for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; they represent the 
most up to date version available at the time this analysis was prepared. 
Capital Impacts 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts‘ transportation capital expenditures are made through the 
MassDOT and MBTA and have a significant impact on the Commonwealth‘s economy.  For every 
dollar in transportation capital investment spending (construction), Massachusetts delivers $2.04 
dollars in output, due to the multiplier effects.  In addition, this change in spending and output 
supports direct, indirect and induced employment and earnings.  Direct employment and earnings 
consist of the construction-related employment and earnings in industries whose jobs and services 
are directly purchased for the projects.  Indirect economic impacts are created by the secondary 
demand for goods and services across a broader spectrum of industrial sectors to support the 
organizations/personnel providing the construction services; while, induced economic impacts are 
created as direct and indirect employees spend their wages on goods and services throughout the 
Commonwealth.  This section estimates the number of total jobs and earnings (direct + indirect + 
induced) that have been generated in Massachusetts based on historic MassDOT and MBTA 
capital expenditures.   
Capital Expenditures 
Massachusetts‘ transportation capital expenditures discussed in this chapter include: 
 MassDOT 
o Highways  
o Transit & Rail  
o Aeronautics  
o Office of the Secretary 
o Central Artery Tunnel 
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 MBTA 
o Bus 
o Heavy Rail 
o Commuter Rail 
o Light Rail 
o Demand Response 
o Trolleybus 
o Ferryboat 
MassDOT provided capital cost estimates for each division for 2007 through 2012.  Additionally 
MassDOT provided the National Transit Database (NTD) Transit Profiles for the MBTA through 
2011, which contained the historic capital costs for the transit agency.  The capital expenditures 
are in year-of-expenditures (YOE) dollars and are summarized below by agency. 
Table 2-1:  Historic Massachusetts Transportation Capital Expenditures (in millions of YOE 
dollars) 
Transportation Capital Expenditures (in millions of YOE dollars) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT  $  1,119.37   $  1,110.93   $  1,317.96   $  1,594.32   $  1,495.22   $  1,603.31  
     Highways  $     825.25   $     949.82   $ 1,169.81   $ 1,392.16   $ 1,358.75   $ 1,420.63  
     Transit  $       21.18   $       34.39   $       56.74   $       88.17   $       46.69   $       60.62  
     Aeronautics  $         5.73   $         6.74   $         9.03   $         5.84   $       16.08   $       13.82  
     OOTS  $       39.61   $       45.39   $       39.01   $       60.59   $       69.14   $       81.90  
     CAT  $     227.60   $       74.60   $       43.37   $       47.56   $         4.56   $       26.34  
MBTA  $     551.40   $     402.93   $     525.14   $     389.40   $     397.44   $               -    
Total  $  1,670.77   $  1,513.86   $  1,843.10   $  1,983.72   $  1,892.66   $  1,603.31  
Source: MassDOT (Gross Expenditures.xlsx) and NTD Transit Profiles for MBTA 
Table 2-1 shows the capital expenditures on MassDOT and MBTA projects for each year 2007 
through 2012 in millions of year-of-expenditure dollars. MassDOT expenditures are broken down 
by transportation mode or project. 
The economic impact of these expenditures (measured here in terms of jobs and earnings) varies 
significantly by activity and depends on the amount of locally produced goods and services 
embodied in the purchases.  Construction goods and services and professional services (soft costs) 
are largely purchased in the local economy.  Although not every building material or engineer 
required for the improvements is produced in Massachusetts, the RIMS II multipliers reflect the 
supplier linkages for the industry, and thus account for this leakage from the Commonwealth‘s 
economy. 
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Capital Jobs and Earnings Effects 
RIMS II multipliers are used to translate the Massachusetts transportation capital expenditures 
shown in Table 2-1 into the associated job and income effects. The RIMS II final demand 
multipliers for the construction and professional services industries are used in this analysis 
because the majority of the capital expenses are costs associated with construction (project or 
program costs) or professional/technical services (design, engineering, administrative/management 
costs).  These multipliers are shown in Table 2-2 for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and are 
described below the table. 
Table 2-2: RIMS II Capital Multipliers for Massachusetts (2010/2010) 
RIMS II Final Demand Multipliers 
  Earnings Employment 
Construction 0.6781 14.3615 
Professional Services 0.7643 13.7603 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Table 2-2 shows the 2010 RIMS II Capital Final Demand Multipliers for earnings and employment 
for both the construction and professional services industries. 
The Final Demand Earnings Multiplier represents the total dollar change in earnings of 
households employed by all industries for each additional dollar of output delivered to final 
demand by the construction and professional services industries. 
The Final Demand Employment Multiplier represents the total change in the number of jobs that 
occur in all industries for each $1 million of output delivered to final demand (in 2010 dollars) by 
the construction and professional services industries. 
Applying the final demand multipliers for the construction and professional services industries to 
the annual construction and project management expenditures provides estimates of the earnings 
and employment impacts generated by the various MassDOT and MBTA capital projects in 
Massachusetts.  The employment results are summarized in Table 2-3, and the earnings results are 
summarized in Table 2-4.  It should be noted that the jobs created in each year only last for that 
year.  In other words, one job is defined as a job for one person of one year‘s duration (i.e. one 
person-year job).       
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Table 2-3:  Massachusetts Transportation Capital Expenditure Employment Impacts, 2007-
2012 (in job-years) 
Capital Employment (Job-years) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT       16,079        15,856        18,820        22,830        21,004        22,113  
     Highway       11,853        13,563       16,717        19,960        19,118        19,628  
     Transit & Rail            304             491             812         1,266             657             838  
     Aeronautics              83               96             129                87             232             198  
     OOTS            571             640             542             834             933          1,085  
     CAT        3,268          1,066             620             683                64             364  
MBTA         7,918          5,757          7,513          5,592          5,598                   -    
Total       23,997        21,613        26,333        28,422        26,602        22,113  
Source:  AECOM  
Note:  To use the final demand multiplier for employment, the construction expenditures were 
deflated/inflated to 2010 dollars using the GDP Capital Non-Defense Deflator and the 
project management expenses were deflated/inflated to 2010 dollars using the GDP Price 
Index Deflator because the RIMS II multipliers are based on 2010 data.   
Table 2-3 shows the calculated capital employment impacts (in job-years) for MassDOT and 
MBTA in the years 2007 through 2012. These figures are the product of the expenditures in each 
category and the corresponding RIMS II employment multipliers. 
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Table 2-4: Massachusetts Transportation Capital Expenditure Earnings Impacts, 2007-2012 
(in millions of 2012 dollars) 
Capital Earnings (in millions of 2012 dollars) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT $798 $788 $934 $1,134 $1,042 $1,097 
     Highway $586 $670 $825 $986 $941 $966 
     Transit & Rail $15 $24 $40 $62 $32 $41 
     Aeronautics $4 $5 $6 $4 $12 $10 
     OOTS         $33          $37        $31         $48          $54          $62  
     CAT $160 $52 $31 $33 $3 $18 
MBTA $388 $282 $368 $274 $274 $0 
Total $1,186 $1,070 $1,302 $1,408 $1,316 $1,097 
Source: AECOM  
Note:  The earnings impacts were deflated/inflated to 2012 dollars using the GDP Capital Non-
Defense Deflator (construction) and the GDP Price Index Deflator (project management) 
in order to make the results comparable across years.   
Table 2-4 shows the calculated capital earnings impacts for MassDOT and MBTA in the years 
2007 through 2012 in millions of 2012 dollars. These figures are the product of the expenditures in 
each category and the corresponding RIMS II earnings multipliers.  
In the case of economic impacts generated by capital expenditures, there are no long-term effects.  
Construction-related impacts only last for the duration of each program‘s construction expense.  
For MassDOT and MBTA, capital expenditures resulted in $1.07 to $1.41 billion (in 2012 dollars) 
in earnings and between 21,613 and 28,422 person-year jobs for each year between 2007 and 
2012. 
Operations and Maintenance Impacts 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts‘ transportation operations and maintenance (O&M) 
expenditures are made through the MassDOT and MBTA.  These O&M expenditures have a 
significant impact on the Massachusetts economy due to direct, indirect and induced employment 
that result from the O&M expenditures associated with the transportation system.  Direct 
employment consists of operations-related employment in industries whose jobs and services are 
purchased directly to operate and maintain the road and transit networks.  Indirect economic 
impacts are those that are created by the secondary demand for goods and services across a broader 
spectrum of industrial sectors to support the organizations/personnel providing the O&M services; 
while, induced economic impacts are created as direct and indirect employees spend their wages 
on goods and services throughout the Commonwealth.  This section estimates the number of total 
jobs and earnings (direct + indirect + induced) that have been generated in Massachusetts based on 
historic MassDOT and MBTA O&M expenditures.   
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O&M Expenditures 
Massachusetts‘ transportation O&M expenditures discussed in this section include MassDOT 
(highways) and MBTA (both in-house transportation and purchased transportation expenses).  
MassDOT provided historic O&M expenses for highways for 2007 through 2012.  Additionally, 
historic MBTA O&M expenses from the MBTA Statement of Revenues and Expenses (SORE) 
were provided through 2012.  The O&M expenditures are in year-of-expenditures (YOE) dollars 
and are summarized below by agency. 
Table 2-5: Massachusetts Transportation O&M Expenditures (in millions of YOE dollars) 
Transportation O&M Expenditures (in millions of YOE dollars) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT  $73.49   $136.10   $159.59   $265.93   $385.08   $290.26  
MBTA  $953.00   $1,010.38   $1,105.18   $1,145.07   $1,187.71   $1,259.15  
Total  $1,026.49   $1,146.48   $1,264.77   $1,411.00   $1,572.79   $1,549.41  
Source: MassDOT (Hwy Oper Exp 10 Years.xlsx and 10 SORE History FY03-FY13.xlsx) 
Table 2-5 shows the operating and maintenance expenditures for MassDOT and MBTA for each 
year between 2007 and 2012 in millions of year-of-expenditure dollars.  
The economic impact of these expenditures (measured here in terms of jobs and earnings) varies 
significantly by activity and depends on the amount of locally produced goods and services 
embodied in the purchases.  Roadway and transit maintenance goods and services and are largely 
purchased in the local economy.  Although not every material required for the maintenance is 
produced in Massachusetts, the RIMS II multipliers reflect the supplier linkages for the industry, 
and thus account for this leakage from the Commonwealth‘s economy. 
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O&M Jobs and Earnings Effects 
RIMS II multipliers are used to translate the Massachusetts transportation O&M expenditures 
shown in Table 2-5 into the associated job and income effects.  RIMS II final demand multipliers 
for the construction and transit and ground passenger transportation industries are used in this 
analysis because the majority of highway O&M expenses are associated with roadway repairs, 
which are most similar to construction, and transit O&M expenses reflect the transit and ground 
passenger transportation industry.  These multipliers are shown in Table 2-6 for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and are described below the table. 
Table 2-6: RIMS II O&M Multipliers for Massachusetts (2010/2010) 
RIMS II Final Demand Multipliers 
 
Earnings Employment 
Construction  0.6781 14.3615 
Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation   0.7025 22.7091 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Table 2-6 shows the 2010 RIMS II Operation and Maintenance Final Demand Multipliers for 
earnings and employment for both the construction and transit and ground passenger 
transportation industries. 
The Final Demand Earnings Multiplier represents the total dollar change in earnings of 
households employed by all industries for each additional dollar of output delivered to final 
demand by the construction and transit and ground passenger transportation industries. 
The Final Demand Employment Multiplier represents the total change in the number of jobs that 
occur in all industries for each $1 million of output delivered to final demand (in 2010 dollars) by 
the construction and transit and ground passenger transportation industries. 
Applying the final demand multipliers for the construction and transit and ground passenger 
transportation industries to the annual O&M expenditures provides an estimate of the earnings and 
employment impacts generated by the operation of MassDOT and MBTA in Massachusetts.  The 
employment results are summarized in Table 2-7, and the earnings results are summarized in Table 
2-8. It should be noted that in the table below, the jobs created in each year only last for that year.  
In other words, one job is defined as a job for one person of one year‘s duration (i.e. one person-
year job).   
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Table 2-7:  Massachusetts Transportation O&M Employment Impacts, 2007-2012 (in job-
years) 
Operations & Maintenance Employment (Job-years) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT            1,056             1,945             2,284             3,819             5,424             4,014  
MBTA          22,670           23,490           25,329           26,004           26,450           27,532  
Total          23,726           25,435           27,613           29,823           31,874           31,546  
Source:  AECOM  
Note:  To use the final demand multiplier for employment, the O&M highway expenditures 
were deflated/inflated to 2010 dollars using the GDP Capital Non-Defense Deflator and 
O&M transit expenditures were deflated/inflated to 2010 dollars using the GDP Price 
Index because the RIMS II multipliers are based on 2010 data.   
Table 2-7 shows the calculated operations and maintenance employment impacts (in job-years) for 
MassDOT and MBTA in the years 2007 through 2012. These figures are the product of the 
expenditures in each category and the corresponding RIMS II employment multipliers. 
Table 2-8:  Massachusetts Transportation O&M Earnings Impacts, 2007-2012 (in millions of 
2012 dollars) 
Operations & Maintenance Earnings (in millions of 2012 dollars) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT $52 $95 $112 $187 $266 $197 
MBTA $728 $755 $814 $836 $850 $884 
Total $780 $850 $926 $1,023 $1,116 $1,081 
Source:  AECOM  
Note:  The highway earnings impacts were deflated/inflated to 2012 dollars using the GDP 
Capital Non-Defense Deflator and the transit earnings impacts were deflated/inflated to 
2012 dollars using the GDP Price Index in order to make the results comparable across 
years.    
Table 2-8 shows the calculated operations and maintenance earnings impacts for MassDOT and 
MBTA in the years 2007 through 2012 in millions of 2012 dollars. These figures are the product of 
the expenditures in each category and the corresponding RIMS II earnings multipliers.  
In the case of economic impacts generated by O&M expenditures, the annual impacts are recurring 
effects that last as long as the existing highway and transit systems continue to be maintained at 
current expenditure levels.  For MassDOT and MBTA, O&M expenditures resulted in $780 to 
$1,116 million (in 2012 dollars) in earnings and 23,726 and 31,874 person-year jobs for each year 
between 2007 and 2012. 
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Summary 
Between 2007 and 2012, annual capital and O&M transportation expenditures by MassDOT and 
MBTA have created or supported average annual person-jobs of 53,183 and earnings of $2.19 
billion (in 2012 dollars).  These averages represent 1.28% of the Commonwealth‘s total 
employment and 0.61% of Commonwealth‘s total personal income in 2011. Construction, 
administration, project management, and operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures 
throughout the Commonwealth have contributed to these gains. The tables below summarize the 
overall employment and earnings, including direct, indirect/induced, and total impacts. 
Table 2-9: Summary of Massachusetts Transportation Economic Impacts, 2007-2012 
Total Employment and Earnings Impacts 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT             
   Direct Impacts 
     
  
        Employment (job-years)   8,790 9,132 10,839 13,680 13,580 13,419 
        Earnings ($2012 M) $479 $498 $589 $744 $736 $729 
   Indirect Impacts             
        Employment (job-years)   8,344 8,668 10,265 12,968 12,848 12,708 
        Earnings ($2012 M) $371 $385 $456 $577 $572 $565 
   Total             
        Employment (job-years)   17,134 17,800 21,103 26,648 26,428 26,127 
        Earnings ($2012 M) $850 $883 $1,045 $1,321 $1,308 $1,294 
MBTA             
   Direct Impacts             
        Employment (job-years)  21,206 20,707 23,003 22,520 22,859 20,783 
        Earnings ($2012 M) $710 $668 $756 $718 $728 $597 
   Indirect Impacts             
        Employment (job-years)   9,382  8,540      9,839       9,076       9,189       6,750  
        Earnings ($2012 M) $407 $369 $426 $391 $396 $287 
   Total             
        Employment (job-years)      30,588       29,247       32,842       31,596       32,048  27,533  
        Earnings ($2012 M) $1,117 $1,037 $1,182 $1,109 $1,124 $885 
Massachusetts Total 
Total Employment (job-years)  
      
47,722  
     47,047       53,946       58,244       58,476       53,660  
 Total Earnings ($2012 M) $1,967 $1,920 $2,227 $2,430 $2,432 $2,178 
Source: AECOM  
Table 2-9 shows the summary of total employment and earnings impacts for MassDOT and MBTA 
from years 2007 through 2012. Employment is reported in job-years, and earnings are reported in 
millions of 2012 dollars. 
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It should be noted that in Table 2-9, the jobs created in each year only last for that year.  In other 
words, one job is defined as a job for one person of one year‘s duration (i.e. one person-year job).   
While the annual employment and earnings impacts shown in Table 2-9 are large, they represent 
less than 1.5% of Massachusetts‘ total employment and less than 1.0% of Massachusetts‘ personal 
income. 
Table 2-10:  Summary of Massachusetts Transportation Economic Impacts as Percentages of 
State Totals, 2007-2012 
Employment and Earnings Impacts as Percentages of State Totals 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MassDOT             
Total Employment   0.41% 0.42% 0.51% 0.64% 0.63% 0.63% 
Total Earnings 0.24% 0.25% 0.31% 0.38% 0.37% 0.36% 
MBTA             
Total Employment   0.73% 0.70% 0.80% 0.77% 0.77% 0.66% 
Total Earnings 0.32% 0.29% 0.35% 0.32% 0.31% 0.25% 
Massachusetts Total 
Total Employment   1.14% 1.12% 1.31% 1.41% 1.40% 1.29% 
Total Earnings 0.56% 0.54% 0.66% 0.70% 0.68% 0.61% 
Source: AECOM calculations using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data 
Table 2-10 shows the MassDOT and MBTA employment and earnings impacts as percentages of 
state totals for years 2007 through 2012. 
Note that all employment and earnings percentages are calculated using total Massachusetts 
employment and income (respectively) for the correlating years as the denominators. The only 
exception is 2012 where the percentages are calculated using 2011 state employment and earnings 
(respectively) as the denominators because the most current state-level data was 2011. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
LITERATURE ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Investments in tools, information and transportation are essential to maintaining and improving the 
economic productivity of industries and of workers. These investments can be made by both the 
private and public sectors and they can be complementary. For example, the efficiency of the 
trucking industry is influenced by the quality and reliability of the truck (the private investment) 
and the degree of safety, maintenance and congestion associated with the roads on which it travels 
(public investment).  
Productivity matters for Massachusetts—a high wage and high cost state—relative to the nation 
because firms are willing to pay more productive workers higher wages. When the balance 
between worker productivity and worker wages, tips and productivity no longer balances wages, 
then earnings growth and the associated living standard slows and firms begin to seek more 
favorable locations elsewhere for expansions and new facilities. In short, the private sector of an 
economy that underinvests in its transportation system becomes less competitive over time. 
Public capital in Massachusetts—the roads, bridges, transit systems, airports, ports and 
railroads
81—represents investments made in the past that support the current economy and 
standard of living. The existing stock must be maintained and recapitalized as elements of the 
network reach the end of their useful life in order for the economy to operate at its current level of 
service. As the system‘s state of good repair deteriorates, it imposes a cost on the economy in 
terms of rising congestion, reduced reliability and higher operating costs.  
Moreover, as the economy grows—translating into greater numbers of travelers and shipments—
the physical capacity of the system must grow as well. Failure to expand to accommodate the 
economy‘s growth yields a strained transportation network with rising levels of traffic congestion, 
potholes in roads that are patched but not rebuilt, reductions in operating speeds, and declining 
system reliability overall. 
Economic researchers have empirically modeled this connection between public investment in the 
stock of transportation assets in an economy and the performance of the economy.  Quantitatively 
measuring the economic return to public investment in transportation stock is complex because 
both productivity and the variety of other public capital investments and economic policies that 
                                                 
81 Public capital takes many other forms as well such as schools, water and waste treatment systems, for 
example. The focus of this report is simply public investment in transportation infrastructure. 
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influence the use and broader context of the investment are difficult to measure precisely. As a 
result, while researchers have generally found a positive correlation between investment in 
transportation infrastructure and economic productivity and growth, there is less consensus about 
the size of the effect.   
Brief Overview of the Academic Literature 
Good transportation access has long been recognized as an essential condition for economic 
development, both domestically and in developing countries. This was a logical assertion—firms 
cannot grow and develop if they cannot reliably access inputs and get their products to market—
but until Aschauer
82
 published his work in 1989, no one had tried to statistically model the impact 
of public transportation investment on economic outcomes. While subsequent researchers have 
differed with Aschauer on his statistical approach, the work sparked considerable interest in the 
issue
83
. The general consensus among these later contributors confirms Aschauer‘s main finding 
that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between transportation investment 
and economic performance. The breadth of this literature is too large to summarize in detail here 
but the table below highlights the findings from some of the main contributions to follow 
Aschauer‘s early work.  
Table 3-1: Summary of Selected Studies on the Effect of Public Capital Investment on 
Economic Outcomes 
Author Where Estimated Size of Impact Dependent Variable 
Aschauer, 1989a National, US 0.24-0.39 Aggregate output 
Munnell, 1990a National, US 0.34 Aggregate output 
Aschauer, 1990 States 0.22-0.37 State income per capita 
Eisner, 1991 States 0.16 Gross state product 
Munnell, 1990b States 0.15 Aggregate output 
Nadiri and Mamuneas, 
1996 
National, US 0.35 (late 1950s/1960) 
0.10 (1980s) 
Aggregate output 
Source: David Banister and Joseph Berechman. Transport Investment and Economic Development, 2000; FHWA 
 
The main conclusion from Table 3-1 is that while estimates of the magnitude vary, there is general 
consensus that the impact of transportation investment on the economy‘s productivity is real and 
positive. Moreover, the impact may vary over time and by type of economy, helping to explain the 
variety of findings in the literature. 
                                                 
82 Aschauer, A.D., “Is public expenditure productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 23:2, 177-200, 1989a. 
See also Aschauer, A.D., “Highway capacity and economic growth,” Economic Perspectives, 14:1, 14-24, 1990.  
83 The main critique of this early work is that the resulting estimated impact on economic output is too large 
to be credible. Later studies have identified a smaller impact. 
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Findings from the Applied Literature 
The applied literature has also considered the influence of public investment on the economy.Both 
corporate planners and the consultants hired to search for relocation / expansion sites recognize the 
value of transportation infrastructure. The Annual Survey of Corporate Executives and the Annual 
Site Selection Consultants Survey, conducted by the Area Development Magazine in 2010, 
describes the site selection process used by both corporations and consultants. 
 The 25th Corporate Survey results presented in 2011 showed that highway access and labor 
costs ranked as the two most important factors to consider when selecting a site for 
business relocation.  Consistent with the past 25 years of survey results, highways were 
considered ―very important‖ or ―important‖ by 97.3% of respondents.   
Labor costs were ―important‖ or ―very important‖ at 91%.  Other important factors included tax 
exemptions, state and local incentives, the availability of skilled or unskilled labor, shipping costs, 
energy availability and costs, and availability of buildings.  Railroad access, while overall is lower 
in importance than the aforementioned criteria, has increased in importance over the years.   
 Similarly, the 26th Corporate Survey in 2011 showed that highway accessibility and labor 
costs are the most important factors in the site selection process, rated as ―important‖ or 
―very important‖ by 94 and 88%, respectively.  Going hand-in-hand with highway access is 
the proximity to major markets, which jumped in importance from 17th in 2010 to 9th in 
2011.  Skilled labor tied with labor costs in the 2011 survey, showing an increase in 
importance over the 2010 survey results. 
A statewide study of highway limitations and traffic delays on the Oregon economy concluded that 
the economic stakes associated with investing in transportation infrastructure and services to keep 
up with economic and population growth were quite substantial. By 2025, the net difference 
between the improvement case and the status quo scenario investigated yielded $1.7 billion in total 
output and more than 16,000 jobs statewide
84
. 
In Texas, researchers have come to a similar conclusion concerning the importance of 
transportation investment for the economy. Focusing on pavement conditions in the state, the 
Center for Transportation Research‘s (CTR) Texas Pavement Preservation Center predicted 
pavement conditions would be 30% worse under TxDOT‘s current 2013 10-year Unified 
Transportation Plan when compared to a better funded maintenance program. While neither 
scenario returned the state‘s pavement to a state of good repair, the higher level of funding avoided 
a sharp increase in total costs for preservation and restoration, saving taxpayers $6.5 billion by 
2022
85
.  
                                                 
84 Economic Development Research Group, “The Cost of Highway Limitations and Traffic Delay to 
Oregon’s Economy,”2007. 
85 Texas Good Roads, The Cost of Doing Nothing, Infrastructure Texas, 2012. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
COST OF UNDERFUNDING THE SYSTEM 
The concept behind economic modeling is that there is one set of economic outcomes associated 
with the status quo level of transportation investment in Massachusetts and a second more favorable 
set of outcomes associated with bringing the system into a state of good repair and addressing 
identified system needs. A comparison of the two sets of outcomes describes the net difference in 
economic performance between the two funding scenarios. That difference represents the economic 
loss or economics benefits of not bringing the network into a state of good repair. As described in 
earlier chapters, under the status quo level of investment, there is a growing backlog of maintenance 
and capacity projects needed to meet the current needs of the economy that is resulting in declining 
levels of system performance.  This chapter describes how the two scenarios were estimated and 
presents the findings.  The model used does not identify improvements for bridge structure 
deficiencies or bike-pedestrian access; therefore, impacts associated with these programs are 
excluded from the analysis.  Due to similar limitations, the impacts of transit and transportation 
capacity expansion also are not included in the model results. 
HERS-ST Model 
The Highway Economic Requirements System – State Version (HERS-ST) is a highway 
investment/performance model application developed by the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA). The model is used to analyze current highway conditions and helps determine future 
highway system needs. Based on engineering principles, the software simulates future highway 
conditions and performance levels and identifies deficiencies.  
Benefits for the identified system-wide improvements are quantified using measures such as 
operational cost savings (auto and truck), changes in travel time, emissions, safety, vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT), vehicle hours traveled (VHT) and pavement conditions. In other words, the model 
is capable of running a variety of scenarios to analyze the effects of funding decisions, usage, and 
maintenance on system performance.  HERS-ST, the state version of the national HERS model 
introduced in 1995 and used by Congress to analyze the state of the nation‘s infrastructure, has been 
used by state departments of transportation since its introduction as a pilot program in 2001.  
Backed by FHWA, it is a reliable source for estimating performance, costs and conditions of a 
state‘s transportation network.  Version 4.5 of the HERS-ST model was used for this analysis.   
State Transportation Network 
HERS-ST accepts highway-section records data in the Highway Performance Monitoring System 
(HPMS) format. HPMS is a national highway information system that contains data on extent, use, 
physical and operating characteristics of the nation‘s highway. Each state is required to submit 
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HPMS data annually to be used in the Conditions and Performance Reports to Congress.  The most 
up-to-date HPMS file describing the road network in Massachusetts was obtained from MassDOT.  
Because it is not possible to monitor and maintain a 100 percent accurate inventory for an entire 
state‘s roadway system, a select list of roadway segments (sample sections) within the HPMS 
dataset is used to represent various attributes for assessing the system-wide performance and 
condition of the network. Limited attributes are reported for non-sample segments. Some of the 
important attributes reported for sample segments include the pavement roughness index, pavement 
condition, average annual daily traffic (AADT), directional factors, posted speed limit, and other 
physical characteristics such as the number of lanes, lane width, shoulder type and width. In 
addition, traffic forecasts (future year AADT) for the sample segments are included in the data set. 
Using expansion factors, the sample segments are extrapolated to give a representation of the entire 
state‘s highway and road system.   
Version 4.5 of HERS-ST (currently available), is compatible with the older format for HPMS 
(submitted prior to 2010).  FHWA is currently working on updating the HERS-ST model that is 
compatible with the new 2010 format of HPMS data
86
. To address the compatibility constraints, the 
2009 HPMS data submitted by MassDOT was used for the analysis. It is assumed that the 2009 
HPMS dataset is a good representation of the Massachusetts highway system in place.   
Funding Levels 
Funding levels applied in the analysis were based on MassDOT‘s Capital Improvement Plan (CIP)87 
for fiscal years 2011 through 2015.  The CIP outlines available funding for the various 
infrastructure and investment types, as well as identifying unfunded needs. The available funds for 
FY 2011 though FY 2013 are based on the financially constrained 2010 Statewide Transportation 
Improvement Plan
88
 (STIP) as well as MassDOT‘s Non-Federal Aid (NFA) Program. Available 
funds in FY 2014 and FY 2015 are based on historic levels of funding.  Specifically, the plan 
allocates available funding as well as unfunded needs for interstate pavement needs, non-interstate 
pavement needs, bridges, safety, toll facilities, non-federal aid maintenance needs, noise barriers 
and shared-use paths.  For HERS-ST modeling, the funds for FY 2010 were assumed to be the same 
as funding in FY 2011.   
                                                 
86 After 2005, HPMS underwent a reassessment to ensure it met the changing business and data needs. As a 
result, several data additions, deletions, and definition changes within HPMS were identified and a revised 
format for HPMS was introduced in 2010. 
87 See Tables 4-1 through 4-8: 
http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/planning/Main/StatewidePlans/CapitalInvestmentPlan.aspx  
88
 The 2010 STIP is the result of MassDOT’s collaboration with its regional partners, the MPOs, and reflects 
the projected federal capital spending for a four-year period. The 2010 STIP covers FY 2010 - FY 2013. 
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Two levels of funding were obtained from the CIP.  The first includes funds that have already been 
dedicated to facility improvements in the STIP/non-federal funding.  This dedicated/available 
funding forms the basis for Scenario 1 in the analysis. 
The second level of funding in the CIP includes funding levels required/identified to meet the 
highway needs in the state.  The identified needs represent the funding gap between projects funded 
through the STIP/non-federal funding and additional projects that would ensure the state‘s 
infrastructure was brought up to a state of good repair.  The identified funding needs are the basis of 
Scenario 2. 
The funding levels from the CIP are shown in Tables 4-1 through 4-8 for interstate pavement needs, 
non-interstate pavement needs, bridges (not including the Accelerated Bridge Program), safety, toll-
funded facilities, non-federal aid maintenance, noise barriers, and shared use paths.  The funds for 
fiscal years 2014 and 2015 are estimates based on the average of funding over the previous three 
fiscal years. 
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Table 4-1: Interstate Pavement 
FY STIP Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011 $ 69,902,860 $128,000,000 $ 58,097,140 
FY 2012 $ 70,093,160 $128,000,000 $ 57,906,840 
FY 2013 $ 69,149,600 $128,000,000 $ 58,850,400 
FY 2014 $ 69,715,207 $128,000,000 $ 58,284,793 
FY 2015 $ 69,715,207 $128,000,000 $ 58,284,793 
Total $ 348,576,034 $ 640,000,000 $ 291,423,966 
Source:  CIP Table 4-1 
 
Table 4-2: Non-Interstate Pavement 
FY STIP Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $ 25,933,339   $185,000,000   $159,066,661  
FY 2012  $14,910,223   $185,000,000   $170,089,777  
FY 2013  $11,814,600   $185,000,000   $173,185,400  
FY 2014  $17,552,721   $185,000,000   $167,447,279  
FY 2015  $17,552,721   $185,000,000   $167,447,279  
Total  $ 87,763,604   $ 925,000,000   $ 837,236,396  
Source:  CIP Table 4-2 
 
Table 4-3: Bridges 
FY STIP Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $162,133,470   $ 305,000,000   $142,866,530  
FY 2012  $140,009,120   $ 305,000,000   $164,990,880  
FY 2013  $121,000,000   $ 305,000,000   $184,000,000  
FY 2014  $147,282,692   $ 305,000,000   $157,717,308  
FY 2015  $147,282,692   $ 305,000,000   $157,717,308  
Total  $ 717,707,974   $1,525,000,000   $ 807,292,026  
Source:  CIP Table 4-3 
 
Table 4-4: Safety 
FY STIP/NFA Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $ 32,071,678   $ 59,900,000   $ 27,828,322  
FY 2012  $ 32,071,678   $ 59,900,000   $ 27,828,322  
FY 2013  $ 32,071,678   $ 59,900,000   $ 27,828,322  
FY 2014  $ 32,071,678   $ 59,900,000   $ 27,828,322  
FY 2015  $ 32,071,678   $ 59,900,000   $ 27,828,322  
Total  $160,358,390   $ 299,500,000   $139,141,610  
Source:  CIP Table 4-4 
Notes:  Safety funding based on historical funding amounts as safety is not normally programmed 
in advance for the STIP. 
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Table 4-5: Toll-Funded Facilities 
FY 
Available Capital 
(Five-Year Average) 
Identified Need Gap 
Metropolitan Highway System  $ 61,195,538   $115,319,991   $ 54,124,453  
Western Turnpike  $ 11,173,586   $ 53,641,860   $ 42,468,274  
Tobin Bridge  $ 17,228,303   $ 17,900,000   $ 671,697  
Total  $ 89,597,427   $ 186,861,851   $ 97,264,424  
Source:  CIP Table 4-5 
 
Table 4-6: Non-Federal Aid (NFA) Maintenance 
FY STIP Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $ 100,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 100,000,000  
FY 2012  $ 100,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 100,000,000  
FY 2013  $ 100,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 100,000,000  
FY 2014  $ 100,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 100,000,000  
FY 2015  $ 100,000,000   $ 200,000,000   $ 100,000,000  
Total  $ 500,000,000   $ 1,000,000,000   $ 500,000,000  
Source:  CIP Table 4-6 
Notes:  Funding based on historical levels as projects are not normally programmed in the STIP. NFA funds in the 
CIP include multiple categories. In the HERS-ST analysis, this category was factored to include funds for 
pavement and safety needs only. 
Table 4-7: Noise Barriers 
FY STIP/NFA Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $  -     $ 5,000,000   $ 5,000,000  
FY 2012  $  -     $ 5,000,000   $ 5,000,000  
FY 2013  $  -     $ 5,000,000   $ 5,000,000  
FY 2014  $  -     $ 5,000,000   $ 5,000,000  
FY 2015  $  -     $ 5,000,000   $ 5,000,000  
Total  $  -     $ 25,000,000   $ 25,000,000  
Source:  CIP Table 4-7 
  
Table 4-8: Shared-Use Paths 
FY STIP Funding Identified Need Gap 
FY 2011  $ 11,298,450   $ 10,000,000   $ (1,298,450) 
FY 2012  $ 3,000,000   $ 10,000,000   $ 7,000,000  
FY 2013  $ 1,400,000   $ 10,000,000   $ 8,600,000  
FY 2014  $ 1,600,000   $ 10,000,000   $ 8,400,000  
FY 2015  $ 1,600,000   $ 10,000,000   $ 8,400,000  
Total  $ 18,898,450   $ 50,000,000   $ 31,101,550  
Source:  CIP Table 4-8 
Notes: Funding based on historical funding amounts over three prior years of non-earmarked funds in STIP. 
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The funds in the CIP are in 2010 dollars.  To be consistent with internal HERS-ST improvement 
pricing parameters, CIP values were deflated to 2008 dollars before being input in the model.  
Funding levels for FY 2016 through the end of the analysis period in FY 2029 were assumed to be 
constant in real terms and equal to those included in the CIP for FY 2015
89
. 
Parameters 
For this analysis, the default parameters were utilized.  The default parameters in HERS-ST consist 
of the costs of reconstruction, resurfacing, shoulder improvements, adding lanes, and realignments.  
Deficiency levels are sub-divided by AADT levels and defined for flat, rolling, and mountainous 
roads.  Price indexes are included for fuel, oil, tires, maintenance, vehicles, fuel excise tax, 
improvement costs, maintenance costs, value of time, vehicle and inventory costs, value of life, 
property, and injuries, crash delay costs, and optional urban freeway costs.  Further, pavement 
factors for the nine functional classes by flexible or rigid pavements are included.  Life 
expectancies of pavements range from 15 to 30 years.  Design period and the maximum pavement 
deterioration rate are optional parameters that can be adjusted. 
Model Outputs 
The HERS-ST model provides a variety of outputs summarizing the impacts of road improvements 
on performance, system conditions and users. Outputs on improvement statistics include total 
initial cost, lane miles improved, net residual value, average B/C ratio, total benefits, user benefits, 
travel time savings, operating cost savings, safety benefits, crashes avoided, injuries avoided, and 
lives saved. The system conditions report portion of the output summarizes operational and safety 
aspects of the overall system including average speed, delay, VMT, VHT, travel time costs, crash 
costs, injury and fatality rates, maintenance costs, and emissions costs. 
Employment Estimate 
The one impact that HERS-ST does not provide is an estimate of jobs gained/lost due to long-term 
changes in system performance. In order to estimate the job impacts, net changes in operating 
costs and truck travel times were allocated across industries using data from the BEA RIMS II 
modeling system. Industry savings were then converted to jobs using output to employment 
factors. The conversion from industry savings to output was not one-to-one as industry research as 
shown that some gains will be taken as profit, some gains will permit the industry to restructure its 
operations, and some gains will be realized as an expansion of economic activity. 
                                                 
89 The funding scenarios applied in the HERS-ST model were developed in consultation with MassDOT to 
ensure they were consistent with current information. 
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Scenarios for HERS-ST 
In order to investigate the effects of investment levels for highway infrastructure in Massachusetts, 
two scenarios were analyzed in HERS-ST.  In each scenario funding constraints were applied to 
evaluate the effects on the network and economy. An overall analysis period of 20 years between 
2009 and 2029 was assumed.  This was further divided into four funding periods (FPs) of five 
years each. 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 consists of the funding levels in the CIP.  The CIP was published in 2010, so the funds 
are in 2010 dollars, and funding in that year was assumed to be equal to funding in FY 2011.  
Funding for FY 2014 and FY 2015 were estimated as average of funds in FY 2011 through FY 
2013, as discussed in the CIP.  Funding for years FY 2016 through FY 2029 was assumed to be 
equal to the funding in FY 2015.  The annual funds were aggregated into four funding periods, 
each representing five years to yield an analysis period of 20 years.  Though shown below for 
completeness, funding levels for bridges and shared-use paths were not considered, as HERS-ST 
does not identify improvements relevant to bridge structure deficiencies and bike-pedestrian access 
deficiencies.   Non-Federal Maintenance funds in the CIP are specified for structures, pavement, 
safety, facilities, and miscellaneous needs. As part of the analysis, this category was factored to 
only include pavement and safety needs.  Scenario 1 funding is shown in Table 4-9. The available 
funds were further deflated to 2008 dollars to be consistent with HERS-ST input data.   
Table 4-9: Scenario 1 Funding (in millions of 2010 dollars) 
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FY11 $69.90 $25.94 $162.13 $32.07 $90.00 $10.50 $11.75 $  - $ 11.30 $413.6 
FY12 $70.09 $14.91 $140.01 $32.07 $90.00 $10.50 $11.75 $  - $ 3.00 $372.3 
FY13 $69.15 $11.81 $121.00 $32.07 $90.00 $10.50 $11.75 $  - $ 1.40 $347.7 
FY14 $69.72 $17.55 $147.28 $32.07 $90.00 $10.50 $11.75 $  - $ 1.60 $380.5 
FY15 $69.72 $17.55 $147.28 $32.07 $90.00 $10.50 $11.75 $  - $ 1.60 $380.5 
Table 4-9 shows the dedicated/available funding for highway projects (as outlined in the CIP) for 
each fiscal year 2011 through 2015 in millions of 2010 dollars.  Funds for bridges and shared-use 
paths were not included as inputs for the HERS-ST model runs. NFA funds were factored to only 
include funds relevant to pavement and safety needs for the HERS-ST model runs. Factoring is 
based on funding needs identified in the CIP for each category.  
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Scenario 2 
Similar to Scenario 1 in structure, Scenario 2 estimates the benefits resulting from an increased 
highway investment to reflect the state of good repair needs in the Commonwealth‘s roadway 
transportation network.  Highway investment outlined in the CIP under funds for indentified needs 
is included in Scenario 2.  Values were adjusted from 2010 dollars to 2008 dollars for use in the 
HERS-ST model.  Overall Scenario 2 results in an increased level of available funding over the 
analysis period.  The difference between Scenario 2 and Scenario 1 funding represents the 
―funding gap‖ in the Commonwealth, as there are more maintenance and construction needs than 
funds available.  The funds used in Scenario 2 are shown in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10: Scenario 2 Funding (in millions of 2010 dollars) 
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FY11  $128.0   $185.0   $305.0   $  59.9   $186.9   $ 21.0   $ 23.5   $ 5.0   $ 10.0   $924.3  
FY12  $128.0   $185.0   $305.0   $  59.9   $186.9  $ 21.0  $ 23.5  $ 5.0 $ 10.0  $924.3  
FY13  $128.0   $185.0   $305.0   $  59.9   $186.9  $ 21.0 $ 23.5  $ 5.0 $ 10.0  $924.3  
FY14  $ 128.0   $185.0   $305.0   $  59.9   $ 186.9    $ 21.0  $ 23.5 $ 5.0 $ 10.0  $924.3  
FY15  $ 128.0   $185.0   $305.0   $  59.9   $ 186.9   $ 21.0   $ 23.5   $ 5.0   $ 10.0   $ 924.3  
 
Table 4-10 shows the funding needs for highway projects (as outlined in the CIP) for each fiscal 
year 2011 through 2015 in millions of 2010 dollars. Funds for bridges and shared-use paths were 
not included as inputs for the HERS-ST model runs. NFA funds only relevant to pavement and 
safety needs were included for the HERS-ST model runs. 
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Results 
The benefits (savings) are displayed in millions of 2008 dollars.   
Table 4-11: Estimated Benefits of Funding Massachusetts’ Highway State of Good Repair 
Needs Summary (2010-2030) 
  
  
Range of Savings (in Billions of Discounted 2008 dollars)* 
Low High 
Travel Time Savings $ 11.1 $ 14.9 
Operating Cost & Safety Savings $ 6.6 $ 11.1 
Total Benefits $ 17.7 $ 26.0 
* Benefits shown are discounted using a 7% discount rate. Discounting adjusts for the opportunity cost of receiving 
benefits over time; it presents all values in a common metric, a net present value. 
Table 4-11 shows the total estimated benefits in billions of discounted 2008 dollars.  The value of 
savings varies from low to high, representing the range of expected benefits.  
 
 By 2030, losses in highway system performance are expected to cost the 
Massachusetts‘s economy between $11.1 and $14.9 billion (in discounted 2008 
dollars) in lost travel time. These costs include auto and truck travel time.   
 An additional $6.6 to $11.1 billion (in discounted 2008 dollars) in auto and truck 
operating costs and safety benefits, which can be avoided if the highway system is 
in a state of good repair, would reduce household budgets for other types of 
spending, such as education and health-related purchases and recreational spending.  
 Reductions in truck operating costs and travel times translate into the availability of 
faster and more reliable freight deliveries, allowing firms to operate and restructure 
in a more productive way. These benefits can take a variety of forms. Shippers use 
lower transportation costs to search for and purchase from less expensive suppliers 
or to deliver goods at lower costs per shipment—this either reduces the cost to the 
final customer, making the firm more competitive or improves the industry‘s profit 
margin (or a combined effect). Greater certainty on delivery times allows 
producers/shippers to keep lower inventories and maintain smaller warehousing 
costs, reducing their production costs. Those that use an in-house transportation 
fleet can reduce the size of that fleet because they need fewer vehicles for congested 
periods. It is estimated between 12,300 and 15,600 jobs are supported through this 
competitive effect by 2030. 
 To the degree that the capacity of the Commonwealth‘s transit systems becomes 
constrained over the analysis period, these estimates are conservative. Should the 
transit system be unable to accommodate future demand, some portion of those 
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travelers ―crowded out‖ of the system would likely travel by auto, adding to the 
demand for road system and increasing the cost of underfunding the road system.  
There also are interactions among modal performance that are difficult to measure, but they are no 
less vital to the success of Massachusetts transportation network.  
 Performance losses in transit can impose costs on highway travelers.  As transit 
capacity is reached, more travelers will be forced onto the roads. Growing capacity 
constraints for the MBTA and the RTAs‘ inability to expand service levels, 
particularly in off-peak times, limit their ability to offset or serve as a relief valve 
for highway congestion. 
 Airports and seaports in Massachusetts are gateways to the global economy.  If 
people and goods cannot efficiently reach these gateways, the Massachusetts 
economy cannot grow or sell its products to a global market. 
 Given that the knowledge economy is an anchor of the Massachusetts economy, the 
efficient movement of people is essential for it to work and compete. 
 
   
53 
 
The  Cos t  o f  Do ing  No th ing  |  The  Ec onomic  Cas e  f o r  T rans po r ta t i on  I nv es tmen t  i n  Mass ac hus e t t s  
CHAPTER 5: 
CASE STUDIES 
All regions of the state will feel the effects of the state‘s eroding transportation infrastructure, but 
the way that the impacts are experienced will vary. Western, Central and Eastern Massachusetts 
differ in the industrial composition of their regional economies and thus place different demands 
on their transportation system and thus require different types of investments to sustain and foster 
local business activity. For example, the western region of the state is less urbanized than other 
parts and thus benefits from improvements that enhance its accessibility and ability to reach a 
larger labor market. Such enhancements support its tourist industry as well. It also has a greater 
reliance on traditional manufacturing and on moving bulk commodities that are less time 
sensitive
90
.   
By contrast, the Eastern region of the state hosts the large Boston urban area and the state‘s 
economic anchor. Here, the challenge is not labor access but rather moving large numbers of 
people and freight in, out and through the urban center efficiently. The mobility of this urban 
center affects more than its own economic health, as the efficiency of the state‘s major sea and air 
gateways are affected by travel conditions in the urban core. Freight flows in this region are more 
likely to be just-in-time delivery for service industries and time-sensitive manufactured goods than 
freight in the western part of the state. The Eastern region is more diverse than Boston, however, 
because of the coastal economy. The southeast region has the highest share of freight-dependent 
jobs of any region at 51%
91
. This is due, in part, to the existence of ports in Fall River and New 
Bedford, and numerous inland distribution centers. 
This chapter provides profiles of the state‘s regions and illustrates how transportation investment 
supports these regional economies. 
Western Massachusetts 
Western Massachusetts, defined in this report as the counties west of Worcester, lags the 
Commonwealth and US economies in job growth
92
. Per capita income for the region was just 
under $40,600 in 2011; the region falls just below the US per capita value of $41,560 and more 
than $12,000 less than per capita income for the Commonwealth as a whole, which stands at 
$53,470
93
.  
                                                 
90 MassDOT, Freight Plan, September 2010. 
91 Freight-dependent jobs include manufacturing, transportation and logistics employment. MassDOT 
Freight Plan. 
92 Those counties are Franklin, Hampshire, Hampden, and Berkshire. 
93 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income. 
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Figure 5-1: Job Growth in Western Massachusetts Relative to the U.S. and State 
Served by Interstates 90 and 91, the 
most accessible airport with scheduled 
air carrier service for much of the region 
is Bradley International Airport in 
Hartford, Connecticut and Albany 
International Airport in Albany, New 
York. The region is also served by 
several general aviation airports 
including Barnes Airport in Westfield, 
which has been selected by Gulfstream as the maintenance facility for their new and largest 
corporate jet. The selection creates 100 new jobs in the area; Massachusetts has provided the 
airport with a grant to improve surface transportation access to the Barnes facility. 
The industrial structure is similar to that of the US economy as a whole, but for a larger than 
average concentration in services and the FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate). Major 
employers in the region include University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Williams, Smith, Amherst, 
and Mt. Holyoke Colleges; Berkshire Medical, Holyoke and Mercy Medical Centers, Berkshire 
Health Systems (Hillcrest Campus) and Cooley Dickinson Hospital, Canyon Ranch and Jiminy 
Peak Mountain Resort, Mass Mutual Life Insurance, and several specialty manufacturers including 
SABIC Innovative Plastics, Yankee Candle, Berry Plastics, OMG Inc. (roofing products), Hasbro 
Games, and L.S. Starrett Company (precision tools).  
Figure 5-2: Services and FIRE Have Higher than Average Shares of Western Region 
Employment 
Lagging job growth and a much lower per 
capita income that limits economic 
opportunity relative to the balance of the 
Commonwealth‘s economy have led to a 
regional ―brain drain‖ as young graduates 
and professionals leave the region in 
search of more favorable labor markets. 
A striking result of the 2002-03 
―Knowledge Corridor‖ studies was that 
45% of graduating seniors planned to 
leave region
94
.  Home to some of the 
nation‘s leading educational institutions 
                                                 
94 Hartford-Springfield State of the Region 2012 Conference. 
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and a region of high quality amenities that draw significant tourist visitation each year, the region 
was losing its younger generation as they sought areas with greater economic opportunity.  
Set against this backdrop, the focus of transportation investment in the Western region is more on 
fostering access rather than on providing capacity as in the eastern portion of the state. In 
Berkshire County, an estimated $136 million is needed to bring the road system into a state of 
good repair. The Berkshire RRTA estimates $5.8 million in additional operating funding is needed 
in order to expand service to establish evening bus service on weekdays and Saturdays, Sunday 
service, and increase service on selected routes including express bus service. Such service would 
allow night workers at the region‘s many health centers, resorts and educational institutions to use 
public transportation. 
In the Pioneer Valley/Springfield area, the leading road project is the I-91 viaduct through 
Springfield, a $400 million project. The elevated highway, which was built in 1968, carries an 
estimated 60,000 to 100,000 vehicles a day. Years of patching have extended the life of the 
facility, but the utility of this approach is ending as potholes open up with wear, disabling vehicles, 
reducing speeds and causing congestion.  
By promoting north-south access and ignoring state boundaries, the region is using its 
transportation investments to expand the diversity of economic opportunity within the functional 
region. For example, the Knowledge Corridor - Restore Vermonter Project will restore Amtrak's 
intercity passenger train service to its original route by relocating the Vermonter to its former route 
on the Pan Am Southern Railroad. This routing offers a shorter and more direct route for the 
Vermonter between Springfield and East Northfield, and improves access to densely populated 
areas along the Connecticut River. Anticipated benefits include a 25 minute reduction in travel 
time, an associated 24% gain in Vermonter ridership and greater reliability that collectively 
support economic revitalization and reduce traffic congestion by offering a reliable alternative. 
Springfield is reconstructing its historic Union Station, a focal point to a larger redevelopment 
initiative. Holyoke, Northhampton and Greenfield have or are planning their own intermodal 
facilities to leverage the rail investment. The larger benefit of this investment is that the region‘s 
residents can remain in Western Massachusetts while having access a larger and more diverse pool 
of employment opportunities. 
Central Massachusetts 
Central Massachusetts, defined in this report as the large central county of Worcester, lags the U.S. 
economy in job growth. The region has historically outpaced the Commonwealth in terms of job 
creation, but the difference in performance has narrowed since 2008 as the region‘s growth has 
decelerated.  Regional per capita income stands at $45,550, well above the U.S. value of $41,560 
in 2011 but still less than the Commonwealth as a whole, which stands at $53,470.  
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Figure 5-3: Job Growth in Central Massachusetts Relative to the U.S. and State 
The region is served by Interstates 90, 
190 and 290. The closest airports 
offering scheduled air carrier service is 
Boston Logan to the east and TF Green 
Airport in Rhode Island. The region is 
also served by numerous general aviation 
airports including Worcester Regional 
Airport in the heart of the region. 
Although the facility lost its only 
scheduled air carrier service earlier this year, Rectrix Aviation, a private jet charter company, is 
establishing operations that will bring more than 100 jobs to the area.  The region‘s rail service is 
expanding as the MBTA increases the frequency of trains to 20 daily between the state‘s two 
largest economies: Worcester and Boston. Freight rail service will improve as well with the 
relocation of the existing Beacon Park CSX rail yard at Allston to expanded facilities in 
Westborough and Worcester. The relocation of the yard opens up the 80-acre site in the Boston 
area for eventual redevelopment.  
The industrial structure of the region mirrors that of the nation for the most part, with smaller 
concentrations of government employment and slightly larger than average concentrations of 
services and FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate industries). Major employers in the region 
include: insurers Commerce Insurance Company, Hanover Insurance, and MAPFRE USA, BNY 
Mellon Wealth Management; and multiple educational institutions including the College of the 
Holy Cross, Assumption College and Clark University. The region has a growing technology base 
as well that includes Saint-Gobain (abrasives and ceramic materials), 3M Company, Abbott 
Bioresearch, Astra Zeneca, Genzyme Genetics and Allegro Micro Systems. Several health care 
firms also top the region‘s list of major employers including Affiliated Podiatrists, Community 
Healthlink, Milford Regional Medical Center, University of Massachusetts Memorial Medical 
Center and VNA Care Network. 
Four industries account for 50% of the employment base in the Central Massachusetts region: 
Health Care, Education, Retail and Manufacturing
95
. This mix reflects the region‘s economic 
transition from reliance on traditional industries, such as manufacturing and logistics, to one that is 
developing its own mix of knowledge industries such as health care and education. 
 
                                                 
95 Greater Worcester CEDS, 2012. 
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Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Western
Pittsfield MA 114 15 114 14 163 17 99 125 80 79
Springfield MA 109 24 103 72 161 18 98 131 87 54
Central
Worcester MA 113 18 105 50 161 18 98 130 94 32
Eastern
Barnstable Town MA 118 11 114 16 205 5 99 122 85 60
Boston MA 138 2 121 4 205 5 99 118 147 3
Cambridge MA 132 3 123 3 161 18 100 113 132 5
Peabody MA 111 20 108 30 161 18 98 129 90 43
Cost of Doing Business Unit Labor Cost Energy Cost State & Local Tax Burden Office Rent
2009 Regional Relative Business Costs, U.S. = 100
Massachusetts Regions*
Figure 5-4: Multiple Large Employers in Education and Health Services Support a Larger 
than Average Concentration of Services 
Supporting the region through this 
transition means sustaining the 
remaining existing industry but also 
fostering connections between the health 
care and education cluster in Central 
Massachusetts and that of Eastern 
Massachusetts. This regional interaction 
has benefits for both Worcester and 
Boston because as they become more 
integrated economically, they can begin 
to compete as a larger economy. It is no 
longer Worcester competing in the 
global economy or Boston competing on its own, but rather the complementary resources of both 
competing together. Investments such as Worcester‘s $32 million dollar renovation of the 
intermodal Union Station building is a major initiative that anchors development but also fosters a 
connection with Boston. The MBTA currently operates 13 round-trip trains per day between Union 
Station and Boston, with more to be added in the future. This train service accommodates more 
than 1,000 daily passengers and provides important access to lower cost housing in Central 
Massachusetts for workers in Boston. The bus pavilion will have a transfer hub to service 
approximately 230 buses a day. The transfer station design been incorporated as part of the 
surrounding Innovation District. 
Reinforcing the synergy between Worcester and Boston is the comparative cost structure. The 
overall cost of doing business in Worcester is about 13% higher than the U.S. average cost. By 
contrast, the comparable cost in Boston is 38% higher, meaning that a business that locates in 
Worcester rather than Boston enjoys a 25 percentage point margin of savings. Moreover, 
Worcester‘s unit labor cost (the cost of labor adjusted for its productivity), is among the lowest in 
the state.   
Table 5.1: Comparative Business Costs Among Massachusetts’ Metropolitan Areas 
 
 
 
 
Source: Moody‘s Analytics. North American Business Cost Review. 2011 Edition 
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The New England Council has identified this structural cost advantage in developing its 
―homeshoring‖ (as opposed to offshoring) strategy—connecting areas of the state that have a 
relatively low cost of labor with industry
96
. In particular, the strategy identifies ways to combine 
production and distribution regions with industry and knowledge hubs to form a supply chain that 
creates complex products or high-value added services. This description covers most of the Central 
region‘s major employers. Because the production of the goods or provision of the service is 
knowledge-intensive, firms benefit from close proximity to universities and industry centers for 
applied research and the opportunity for learning and exchange that this offers. Transportation 
investments that foster this easy exchange of people and ideas supports the growth of technology 
firms and allows both Worcester and Boston to exploit the structural cost advantage to the 
Commonwealth‘s benefit.  They also support travel between Worcester and Boston for Boston-
area workers who want to take advantage of Worcester‘s lower housing costs. 
Eastern Massachusetts 
Eastern Massachusetts, defined in this report as all counties east of Worcester County, lags the 
U.S. economy in job growth but tracks the Commonwealth pace closely
97
. Per capita income is 
$56,870 for the region as a whole, over $15,000 above the U.S. per capita figure and $3,400 above 
the Commonwealth value in 2011. When the Boston metropolitan economy is excluded from the 
Eastern region figure, the per capita income figure falls slightly to $55,970, but remains well above 
the U.S. and Massachusetts values. 
Figure 5-6: Job Growth in the Eastern Region Relative to the U.S. and State 
The Eastern region is served by a dense 
intermodal transportation network that 
includes Interstates 90, 93, 95 and 495, 
multiple seaports, and the Northeast 
Corridor intercity rail corridor 
connecting the region to the nation‘s 
economic and political centers. The 
region has access to scheduled air carrier 
service at Boston Logan Airport, 
Barnstable Municipal Airport, and airports in Providence, RI and Manchester, NH. The region also 
benefits from a dense public transit network of transit and commuter rail, buses and ferries. 
 
                                                 
96 The New England Council and Deloitte Consulting LLP. Smart Infrastructure in New England An 
investment for growth and prosperity,  October 2012 
97 The Eastern counties include Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, Middlesex, Nantucket, Norfolk, Plymouth 
and Sussex. 
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Figure 5-7: Services and FIRE Account for Over 60 Percent of Eastern MA Employment 
Services and FIRE (finance, insurance, 
and real estate) employment accounts for 
over 60% of the region‘s employment. 
Major employers in the region include: 
Harvard and Boston Universities and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
health care/research centers such as 
Brigham & Women‘s, Massachusetts 
General, and Sinai Hospitals, the Dana 
Farber Cancer Institute; the Boston Red 
Sox; Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institute; finance and insurers such as 
John Hancock Life Insurance, Liberty Mutual Group, MetLife and the Bank of New York Mellon, 
and technology firms such as Lockheed Martin MS2, Nortel Networks, Juniper Networks, EMC 
Corp., and Cisco Systems. 
Large complex urban areas such Boston, and the associated Northeast Corridor megapolitan that it 
helps anchor, exist because they are focal points for commercial transactions. Urban areas provide 
access to large pools of labor, frequent and relatively inexpensive air transport, specialized 
technical and professional services, and a large client base. These factors and others provide so-
called agglomeration economies that diminish the cost of transactions and make the urban area‘s 
firms more productive. Balanced against the advantages of urban size are the diseconomies of 
large urban areas; these negatives include higher living and business costs such as rents, crime and 
traffic congestion. As long as firms and households perceive that the advantages outweigh the 
negatives of a Boston location, firms and households will locate in the urban area, incur the costs, 
and the metro economy will grow and thrive. When the negatives just equal the benefits, the urban 
area is at its optimal size and growth will languish. When the negatives outweigh the benefits, 
existing businesses choose to expand elsewhere and population growth slows. 
Investments to expand travel capacity or improve the travel time of public transit service reduce 
the negatives associated with congestion and thus influence the urban area‘s size and its density of 
people and firms—it is a critical factor influencing sensitivity to land and labor costs. Absent the 
ability to reliably move large numbers of specialized skilled labor in, out and within the urban 
economy on a daily basis such as that provided by the MBTA system, Boston‘s economic potential 
is constrained. The same idea holds true for other types of infrastructure as well. Each 
infrastructure investment in the overall Boston regional travel network, such as the South Coast 
rail project, extensions to the existing system, or improvements to the existing system that relieve 
bottlenecks and add capacity at core area expands the ability of the economy to manage density. 
These benefits are capitalized into the property values at the locations where the benefits are 
consumed, supporting the economic vitality of the region. The ability to offer a sustainable quality 
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of life is thus central to the Greater Boston area‘s ability to offset the costs of population and 
employment growth. 
Boston‘s Regional MPO, the Central Transportation Planning Staff, have reported that the current 
system is already hitting capacity constraints
98
.  
 The MBTA Green Line Central Subway is currently operating at capacity and the 
Orange Line is overcrowded during peak hours in the section between Downtown 
Crossing and North Station.   
 The Haverhill, Fitchburg, Franklin, Stoughton and Needham lines are constrained 
by sections of single track.  
 Additional tracks are needed at South Station to accommodate service growth on 
south side commuter rail lines. 
But more than specific points of congestion, the constraints on the system have larger implications 
for the development of the region. The Metropolitan Area Planning Council has analyzed the 
development capacity of the areas around station areas and concluded that ―transit station areas 
could accommodate more than 76,000 new housing units and space for more than 130,000 new 
jobs by 2035: nearly one-third of projected housing unit growth regionwide and more than half of 
projected job growth.
99‖ These station areas can only support this growth if the system is able to 
grow and support higher volumes of travelers. Put another way, constraints on the transit system‘s 
capacity will limit the market potential of station areas—increasing the likelihood that this land is 
underdeveloped and not used to its full potential.  
Elsewhere in the Eastern Region, structurally deficient bridges in Falmouth, Dennis and Chatham 
are in danger of being closed because of their poor condition. The Chappaquoit Road Bridge in 
Falmouth is the only access route to several homes. The cities of New Bedford and Fall River do 
not have commuter rail service. Commuting options are limited to Route 24, which is seriously 
congested. A rail option would permit these lower cost communities to better integrate with the 
larger Eastern region economy. 
                                                 
98 CTPS, Paths to a Sustainable Region, Long-Range Transportation Plan, Chapter 10. Regionwide Needs 
Assessment. 
99 MAPC, Growing Station Areas: The Variety and Potential of Transit Oriented Development in Metro Boston, 
June 2012. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no doubt that the Commonwealth is recovering from the recession at a pace that is faster 
than the nation.  As shown in the chart below, Massachusetts employment growth traditionally is 
more stable – exceeding national employment growth during recession years but more moderate 
during non-recession years.  Massachusetts‘ job growth continues to improve as the national 
economy is getting back on track, and the future looks bright for Massachusetts, with employment 
levels in the Commonwealth projected to increase more than 15% between 2010 and 2020
100
. 
Figure 6-1: Comparison of Annual Employment Growth for the U.S. and State, 2003-2011 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
However, there is a serious problem that could stop this growth in its tracks.  If Massachusetts 
does nothing to repair and improve its transportation infrastructure, the current recovery and 
potential for future economic growth could easily stall.  This is not just a problem for Greater 
Boston.  Rather it imperils jobs and economic growth throughout the entire state.  Simply put, the 
Commonwealth‘s transportation network is essential to its vitality, competitiveness and quality of 
life. 
                                                 
100 Massachusetts Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Market Information, Massachusetts Long-term 
Industry Projection, 2011.  http://lmi2.detma.org/Lmi/Industry_Projection.asp  
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Massachusetts is at a crossroads.   
Although Massachusetts currently has a robust, multimodal transportation network, this 
infrastructure is among the oldest in the U.S. and increasingly has needs for recapitalization to 
replace and modernize facilities and bring them up to modern design standards.  The 2007 
Transportation Finance Commission, an independent body of transportation experts and business 
and civic leaders created by statute to examine and evaluate the financial health of Massachusetts 
transportation agencies and authorities, concluded that the Commonwealth‘s transportation system 
had been inadequately maintained for decades. The 2007 Commission estimated that it would 
require at least an additional $15 to $19 billion in funding, above projected revenues, to bring its 
existing surface transportation system to a state of good repair and maintain it at that level
101
. It is 
important to note that this estimate excluded expansion in capacity and/or service levels to 
accommodate population and workforce growth. 
Competing funding priorities and strained government coffers are limiting the resources available 
to maintain the existing assets in a state of good repair and to expand and upgrade the system to 
keep pace with the Commonwealth‘s economy as it grows and evolves.  The Commonwealth‘s 
high level of transportation debt as compared to other states, the inability of MassDOT and the 
MBTA to fund their full state of good repair needs and growing operating deficits of the MBTA 
and Regional Transit Authorities are placing an ever increasing pressure on the transportation 
system.   
 State of good repair needs are growing; Massachusetts is unable to keep up 
with funding its current infrastructure maintenance needs. 
o MassDOT has shown that $1 billion per year is needed for the Metropolitan 
Highway System Capital Maintenance Program; however, only $400 
million is currently programmed annually
102
.   
o Massachusetts cities and towns also face a shortfall in the ability to maintain 
their streets and bridges in a state of good repair.  The Massachusetts 
Municipal Association puts the total need at $562 million/year, while 
Chapter 90 only provides $200 million per year – resulting in an annual 
shortfall of $362 million.
103
 
o MassDOT has $240 million in operating expenses being capitalized.  
o The MBTA backlog of good repair projects is at least $3 billion.   
                                                 
101 Massachusetts Transportation Finance Commission, Transportation Finance in Massachusetts: An 
Unsustainable System, March 2007. 
102 Massachusetts Department of Transportation, Capital Investment Plan FY 2011-2015, 2010.  
103 Massachusetts Municipal Association, MMA Study: Cities and Towns Need a Dramatic 
Increase in Chapter 90 Funding to Repair Local Roads, MMA Special Report, December 18, 2012.   
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o The 15 state RTAs are also facing a state of good repair backlog of $150 
million, largely due to an aging fleet.
104
 
 Debt service payments represent a large portion of Massachusetts’ annual 
transportation spending. 
o In FY 2012, 45% of the MassDOT and MBTA operating budgets will go to 
pay off debt.
105
 
o MassDOT receives $648 million in federal funding. Of that, $159 million 
(nearly 25%) immediately goes back to the federal government to pay off 
the ―Grant Anticipation Notes‖ used to finance the Big Dig and the 
Accelerated Bridge Program.
106
   
o The MBTA is borrowing $470 million per year to cope with a state of good 
repair backlog that exceed $3 billion.
107
 
o The MBTA has $8.6 billion with interest in debt outstanding. $3.6 billion of 
this debt was inherited from the Commonwealth in Forward Funding, 
including the so-called ―Big Dig debt‖ for transit commitments related to 
the Central Artery project.
108
 
o MBTA debt service payments were $448.2 million in FY 2012 and 30 cents 
of every dollar in revenue goes to pay debt. Debt service is roughly equal to 
fare box revenues and to the T‘s entire payroll.109 
As the Commonwealth system‘s state of good repair deteriorates through underinvestment, it 
imposes a real, measurable economic loss in terms of rising congestion, reduced reliability and 
higher operating costs.  Like a private firm, the productivity of an economy is influenced by its 
level of investment.  Failure to maintain the system and accommodate growth yields: 
 A strained transportation network with rising levels of road and transit congestion, 
potholes in roads that are patched but not rebuilt, disabled transit vehicles that 
strand travelers and declining system reliability.   
 Inefficient movement of people and goods, significantly impacting productivity and 
costs of doing business, which results in greater uncertainty about future conditions 
and costs.  
                                                 
104 A Better City, Policy Position Paper on MBTA Fare Increase, March 2012.   
105 Transportation for Massachusetts, Maxed Out: Massachusetts Transportation at a Financing Crossroad, 
October 2011.   
106 Ibid. 
107 MBTA, MBTA Fare and Service Changes: Join the Discussion, January 2012. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
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This leads to a loss of business confidence and a reluctance to invest and expand, limiting 
economic development. When firms consider building new offices and factories, they are taking 
into account the long-term commitments to operate in that location. Rising congestion and 
deteriorating network reliability are signals that future business conditions may be more 
challenging, leading potential investors to consider other locations.  
This is particularly critical in 2013, as both the local and national economies are facing an 
uncertain recovery. Massachusetts has proven to be resilient during the recession, and while FY 
2014 shows an improving revenue picture, the state is still a long way from experiencing the level 
of revenue growth prior to the recession. Continued recovery and strong economic performance 
may be compromised by an under-maintained transportation system and the inability to expand to 
accommodate future economic growth—particularly as other states continue to invest in the 
maintenance and expansion of their transportation networks.   
There is a cost to doing nothing.  
When the system‘s physical qualities do not efficiently accommodate the movement of goods and 
people, performance deteriorates and imposes a cost—a severe penalty—on the Commonwealth‘s 
economy. This cost can occur through a variety of means as described below.  
 Facilities that are not in a state of good repair lead to increases in operating costs for 
cars, trucks and railroads and increase the likelihood of crashes—translating into 
costs associated with property damage, injury and loss of life.  By 2030, these 
operating and safety costs are expected to total $6.6 to $11.1 billion (in discounted 
2008 dollars). 
 Increased congestion translates into greater travel times, diverting valuable time 
from productive work or the non-work activities that support a high quality of life. 
By 2030, these losses in travel time are expected to cost the Massachusetts‘ 
economy between $11.1 and $14.9 billion (in discounted 2008 dollars). 
 The diversion of additional resources to mitigate rising congestion and operating 
costs shifts resources to dealing with these problems, reducing the productivity of 
business in the Commonwealth.  This translates into losses in income and jobs.  It is 
estimated that between 12,300 and 15,600 jobs will be lost to Massachusetts due to 
its deficient highway transportation network by 2030. This is a small fraction when 
compared to the total size of the state‘s employment base, but it is equivalent to 
losing one of the state‘s largest employers nearly every year. 
 Travelers‘ efforts to avoid highly congested points of the network—bottlenecks for 
example—can lead them to travel longer distances. 
 Rising congestion and bottlenecks erode travel reliability, increasing the amount of 
time commuters and shippers must allow in order to achieve on-time delivery. 
Some shippers will hold higher inventories in order to compensate, raising their 
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overall business costs in order to compensate for the transportation system‘s 
performance. 
 Deteriorating system performance translates into vehicles that are not operating at 
their most efficient levels—yielding environmental costs.  The environmental 
consequences of traveling longer distances include air quality impacts, increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions and rising water pollution from roadway runoff. 
 There is the real concern about deferred maintenance on the system and safety, but 
there is also an impact on the cost.  Fixing the system in the near term can help 
Massachusetts avoid cost growth in the future.  Based on historic trends, it is 
expected that the cost of construction will grow by 3.2% per year
110
, with 10 years 
from now producing a compounded cost that is 37% higher than today. 
This is a statewide problem.  
All regions of the state will feel the effects of the state‘s eroding transportation infrastructure, but 
the way that the impacts are experienced will vary. Western, Central and Eastern Massachusetts 
differ in the industrial composition of their regional economies and thus place different demands 
on their transportation system and thus require different types of investments to sustain and foster 
local business activity. For example, the western region of the state is less urbanized than other 
parts and thus benefits from improvements that enhance its accessibility and ability to reach a 
larger labor market.  By contrast, the Eastern region of the state hosts the large Boston urban area 
and the state‘s economic anchor. Here, the challenge is not labor access but rather moving large 
numbers of people and freight in, out and through the urban center efficiently. 
Quantified Impacts 
To help estimate the costs of not funding Massachusetts‘ highway ‗state of good repair‘ needs, the 
Federal Highway Administration‘s (FHWA) Highway Economic Requirements System – State 
Version (HERS-ST) model was used.  These costs are measured in the model as the benefits of 
funding the full highway maintenance state of good repair needs in Massachusetts‘ Capital 
Investment Plan FY 2011-2015 rather than maintaining the current levels of funding shown in the 
plan.  The results of the analysis are summarized in the table below.   
                                                 
110 ENR, Construction Cost Index, Average Annual Growth, 1990-2011. 
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Table 6-1: Estimated Benefits of Funding Massachusetts’ Highway State of Good Repair 
Needs Summary (2010-2030) 
  
  
Range of Savings (in Billions of Discounted 2008 dollars)* 
Low High 
Travel Time Savings $ 11.1 $ 14.9 
Operating Cost & Safety Savings $ 6.6 $ 11.1 
Total Benefits $ 17.7 $ 26.0 
*Benefits shown are discounted using a 7% discount rate. 
 
 By 2030, losses in highway system performance are expected to cost the 
Massachusetts economy between $11.1 and $14.9 billion (in discounted 2008 
dollars) in lost travel time. These costs include auto and truck travel time.   
 An additional $6.6 to $11.1 billion (in discounted 2008 dollars) in auto and truck 
operating costs and safety benefits, which can be avoided if the highway system is 
in a state of good repair, would reduce household budgets for other types of 
spending, such as education and health-related purchases, and recreational 
spending.  
 Reductions in truck operating costs and travel times translate into the availability of 
faster and more reliable freight deliveries, allowing firms to operate and restructure 
in a more productive way. These benefits can take a variety of forms. Shippers use 
lower transportation costs to search for and purchase from less expensive suppliers 
or to deliver goods at lower costs per shipment—this either reduces the cost to the 
final customer making the firm more competitive or improves the industry‘s profit 
margin (or a combined effect). Greater certainty on delivery times allows 
producers/shippers to keep lower inventories and maintain smaller warehousing 
costs, reducing their production costs. Those that use an in-house transportation 
fleet can reduce the size of that fleet because they need fewer vehicles for congested 
periods. It is estimated that between 12,300 and 15,600 jobs are supported through 
this competitive effect. 
 Not only do transportation investments help us to get around safely and reliably, 
move needed goods and help to grow business and jobs, they also have their own 
economic benefits and influences. For every dollar in transportation capital 
investments spending, Massachusetts delivers $2.04 dollars in output, due to the 
multiplier effects
111
.  
 
  
                                                 
111 BEA, RIMS II Regional Multipliers for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Type II, 2010 
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There are limits to the quantified impact analysis.  It is important to note that HERS-ST does not 
identify improvements for bridge structure deficiencies and bike-pedestrian access; therefore, 
impacts associated with these programs are excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the impacts of 
transit and transportation capacity expansion also are not included in these results.   
There also are interactions among modal performance that are difficult to measure, but they are no 
less vital to the success of Massachusetts transportation network.  
 Performance losses in transit can impose costs on highway travelers.  As transit 
capacity is reached, more travelers will be forced onto the roads. Growing capacity 
constraints for the MBTA and the RTAs‘ inability to expand service levels, 
particularly in off-peak times, limit their ability to offset or serve as a relief valve 
for highway congestion. 
 Airports and seaports in Massachusetts are gateways to the global economy.  If 
people and goods cannot efficiently reach these gateways, the Massachusetts 
economy cannot grow or sell its products to a global market. 
 Given that the knowledge economy is an anchor of the Massachusetts economy, the 
efficient movement of people is essential for it to work and compete. 
Massachusetts economic costs beyond quantification. 
Productivity matters for Massachusetts.  It is a high wage and high cost state relative to the 
nation—because firms are willing to pay more productive workers higher wages. As shown in the 
table below, Massachusetts has the highest business costs in the region and among the highest in 
the nation.   
Table 6-2: State Business Cost Comparison for Massachusetts and its Neighbors  
Massachusetts and 
Surrounding States 
Cost of Doing Business Unit Labor Cost Energy Cost 
State & Local Tax 
Burden 
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank 
Massachusetts 124 1 117 1 169 3 99 19 
Connecticut 113 4 99 24 183 2 111 8 
New Hampshire 111 7 104 7 162 4 80 45 
New York 110 9 97 29 146 8 142 1 
Vermont 110 10 104 5 130 11 111 7 
Rhode Island 102 14 92 39 150 6 109 9 
Source:  Moody‘s Analytics 
Note:  An index value of 100 means a state‘s costs are equal to the U.S. average. States are 
ranked out of 51 (50 states plus the District of Columbia). A rank of 1 is the highest 
cost; a rank of 51 is the lowest. 
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However, competitive advantages are not static.  When the benefits of Massachusetts‘ high 
productivity no longer outweigh operational costs, employers‘ earning growth will slow and firms 
will seek more locations outside of Massachusetts for expansion or relocation.  Additionally, while 
Massachusetts is struggling to keep pace with the maintenance of its transportation network, 
competing states are making significant transportation capacity and maintenance investments, 
widening the gap between the performance of these states and Massachusetts.  As a result, by 
underinvesting in its transportation system, the Massachusetts transportation performance is 
eroding and the economy is becoming less competitive over time.  While transportation investment 
is not the only component of Massachusetts‘ competitiveness, many of the other factors are outside 
of the Commonwealth‘s ability to influence or control.  Its investment in core infrastructure, 
however, is directly within Massachusetts‘ own control.   
Collectively, this loss of transportation performance threatens Massachusetts‘ ability to be a global 
competitor in coming decades. 
 The health of the state‘s economic anchor relies on the daily efficient movement of 
people in and out of Boston, the urban core and economic centers throughout the 
state. Without an efficient transportation system, the daily flow of workers and 
goods to the dense urban market could not be achieved. 
 Landside access to the state‘s marine ports and airports is critical to utilizing these 
gateways to the global economy. Air and marine carriers select ports (air or marine) 
with efficient inland distribution networks for imports.  
 The efficient operation of the state‘s road, bridge and transit network is necessary 
for the Commonwealth to remain a dominant economy within the U.S. Northeast 
region. 
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